Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process:
A Reply to Professor Mishkin
Herman Schwartz

The judicially created revolution in criminal procedure dating from
Mapp v. Ohio has thrown off numerous difficult problems of retroactivity. The Supreme Court has recently begun to grapple with these
problems,' and commentators, some of whom have long been fascinated by the "conflict of laws in time," have lately turned increasing
attention to them. 2 One of the most important of the recent articles
on this subject is Professor Paul Mishkin's The Supreme Court, 1964
Term Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law.3 This article, an outgrowth of Professor Mishkin's earlier work on more general retroactivity issues, 4 focuses on the
applicability of newly enunciated due process standards to habeas
corpus petitions filed by state prisoners whose convictions became final
before the date of the enunciating decision. It concludes that unless
the newly enunciated constitutional rights affect the reliability of the

guilt-determining process, retroactivity should be denied.
Professor Mishkin's article is an important one not only because of
the great power of the author's analysis, but also because it reflects a
Herman Schwartz, Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, received an
A.B. degree in 1953 and an LL.B. degree in 1956 from Harvard University. The author
wishes to express his deep appreciation to several of his colleagues and to Daniel Rezneck,
Esq., for their extremely helpful, and often sharply critical, comments.
1 Johnson v. New Jersey, 86 Sup. Ct. 1772 (1966). Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
2 Among the many articles are Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. Rv. 650 (1962); Currier, Time and
Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. R.v. 201 (1965); Meador,
Habeas Corpus and the "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. Rlv. 1115 (1964); Note, Linkletter, Shott and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 832 (1966);
Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE
L.J. 907 (1962); cf. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 378 (1964); Redlich, Constitutional Law, 1962 Survey of New York Law, 14
SivAcuS I REv. 167, 170-72 (1962).
3 79 HARV. L. REv. 56 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Mishkin).
4 MISHKIN & MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS (1965).
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view widely held among both courts and commentators.5 This article
will indicate possible shortcomings to the Mishkin approach in terms
of utility, equality of treatment, consistency with prior decisions, and
congruence with the current functions and operation of habeas corpus.
It will argue that all newly declared constitutional rights should be
given retroactive effect, because (1) the norms now being given federal
constitutional sanction are not newly relevant, but rather so basic to
our kind of constitutional democracy that convictions violative of them
cannot be allowed to stand; and (2) the disadvantages of complete
retroactivity have been greatly exaggerated.
I. THE MISHKIN APPROACH
In Part I of his article, Professor Mishkin urges that for institutional,
symbolic, and functional reasons, judicial decisions should almost always be accorded retroactive effect. Institutionally, courts exist to resolve past disputes, and adjudication thus inherently points retrospectively. Symbolically, and probably most importantly, much of the
power and prestige of courts depends on the attribution of impartial
impersonality to judges, who, under the Blackstonian conception, do
not create but only declare "fixed overriding law"; 6 although this
symbol of impartial and impersonal fidelity to preexisting law is often
far from reality, abandoning it in favor of a general power of nonretroactive overruling would put the courts in the highly undesirable and
politically vulnerable posture of overt legislators. Functionally, because
retroactivity produces particularly strong reactions from those affected,
judicial awareness that innovating decisions will have to be given
retroactive effect may make for greater restraint.
Because of his general preference for retroactivity, Professor Mishkin deplores the fact that in Linkletter v. Walker7 the Supreme Court
based its holding (that Mapp is not available on habeas corpus to convictions which became final before the date of decision) on a "general
power-and hence duty-to decide 'in each case' whether a rule
5 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Romano v. Fay, 360 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966); Mordecai
v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 694, 702-03 (D.D.C. 1966); In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 398
P.2d 380, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1965); Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670
(1965); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76
HARv. L. REv. 441, 527 n.220 (1963); Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for
Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 CoLTm. L. Rxv. 223, 228 n.23 (1966); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 H-Iv. L. Rav. 938, 1013 (1966); Note, supra note 2, 71
YAlm L.J. at 943.
6 Mishkin 62.
7 381 US. 618 (1965).
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should be given retroactive effect."8 The claim of such a general power
is at war with the above-stated values, for it openly proclaims the legislative powers of the Court. Even on its own terms, Professor Mishkin
further argues, the Linkletter decision was unwarranted. Although the
Court noted that state officials had relied upon Wolf v. Colorado,9
such reliance was unjustified since Wolf had made it clear that at least
the "core" of the fourth amendment was applicable to the states. Moreover, why should the benefit of retroactivity be given to Mrs. Mapp
but not to Linidetter? The stated purposes of Mapp-deterrence of
unconstitutional invasions of privacy and attainment of a more harmonious state-federal relationship-are furthered no more by retroactivity for Mrs. Mapp
than for Linkletter, for in both cases "repara10
tion comes too late.2
For reasons he sets forth in Part III, however, Professor Mishkin
concludes that both Mapp and Linkletter are not only right but also
consistent with each other. Mrs. Mapp's case came up on direct review,
and, in accordance with the normal preference for retroactivity, she
received the benefit of the ruling, even if its rationale pointed prospectively. Linldetter's case, on the other hand, came up collaterally,
on habeas corpus, and here:
The doctrine that a final judgment entered under a given
rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in the
rule is long established, and though that doctrine is perhaps
more firmly settled in the context of civil litigation, the
underlying considerations of finality find significant parallels
in the criminal field. From this aspect, the Linkletter problem becomes not so much one of prospectivity or retroactivity
of the rule but rather of the availability of collateral attack
-in this case federal habeas corpus-to go behind the otherwise final judgment of conviction.:"
For Professor Mishkin, collateral relief is extraordinary relief, justified in only two situations. The first he explains as follows:
[R]ecognition of . . . [constitutional defects in the proce-

dure used to convict] serves to free prisoners as to whom
there is greater doubt than the Constitution allows that
they have in fact done the acts which constitute the crime
for which they are being punished.
8 Mishkin 58.
9 388 U.S. 25 (1949).
10 Linkletter v. Walker, 881 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
11

Mishkin 77.
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is heightened or added
the reliability of a findessentially establishes a
the condition for crim-

Valuing the liberty of the innocent as highly as we do,
earlier proceedings whose reliability does not measure up to
current constitutional standards for determining guilt may
well be considered inadequate justification for continued detention .

. .

. On this basis, habeas corpus would assess the

validity of a conviction, no matter how long past, by any
current constitutional standards which have an intended effect of enhancing the reliability of the guilt-determining
process.

12

The second function of habeas corpus is to provide a substitute in
the federal district courts for the unavoidably rare direct Supreme
Court review of state decisions to enforce federal standards of dignity,
integrity, and reliability. Insofar as the "intended effects" of a particular newly enunciated constitutional right are limited to furthering
dignity and integrity and not reliability, Professor Mishkin contends,
there is no reason to apply, on habeas corpus, standards that would not
have been applied on direct review; upsetting old convictions cannot
further these values.
Applying this analysis to specific cases, it is clear that Mapp did not
improve the reliability of the process, whereas Gideon v. Wainwright,13 Griffin v. Illinois,14 Griffin v. California,15 and Malloy v.

Hogan'6 did. Coerced confessions likewise involve reliability, for coercion impairs, among other things, trustworthiness. Escobedo v. Illinois,17 however, "does not seem principally aimed at improving the

trustworthiness of suspects' statements; protection of personal dignity
and integrity, within the framework of an adversary system, seems a
far more satisfactory rationale."' 8
12

Id. at 80-82.

13 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Professor Mishkin points out, however, that Griffin v. Illinois is

an equal protection case, and that his concern is solely with procedural due process.
Mishkin 83.
15 380 U.S. 609 (1965). It is not altogether clear from Professor Mishkin's article
whether he think that all aspects of the privilege against self-incrimination should be
given retroactive effect. His discussion focuses on Griffin v. California, but he seems to
indicate retroactivity should be accorded to the privilege in general.
16 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
17 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
18 Mishkin 95.

1966]

Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process

The foregoing is Professor Mishkin's theory as I understand it. No
summary, however, can do justice to the numerous subtle insights, or
to the painstaking, balanced, and lucid comprehensiveness of his analysis. Nevertheless, with all deference, I think this approach contains too
many difficulties to be workable and is fundamentally wrong.
II.

SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE MISHKIN APPROACH

The Inconsistency Between PartsI and III
As previously mentioned, one of Professor Mishkin's major arguments against nonretroactive overruling is that it puts the Court into
an overt legislative posture, thus exposing it to numerous political and
doctrinal strains. But his own approach exposes the Court to precisely
the same strains. Under his theory, the Court will have to make at
least as many explicit and controversial decisions in respect to retroactivity as are necessary-and to him, deplorable-under a "general
prospectivity power" theory. This is because every facet of every right
"absorbed" into the fourteenth amendment will be raised on habeas
corpus by some prisoner somewhere as soon as it is declared, and the
Court will then have to make an overt, explicit choice between retroactivity and nonretroactivity. The fact that the issue arises on collateral attack some time after the right is first declared will not reduce
the number of necessary choices, nor will the particular criterion by
which retroactivity will be determined: once it is decided that only
some rulings will be given retroactive effect, choices must openly be
made, and it is the open display of change and of choice which exposes
the legislative powers of the Court.
Indeed, where collateral attack is concerned, Professor Mishkin
seems to swing almost completely away from his earlier preference for
retroactivity, and to set up instead a presumption against retroactivity.
Professor Mishkin proposes, as did the Court in Linkletter, that on
collateral attack new standards not be applied to old convictions unless good cause is shown, i.e., unless reliability is involved. 19 Thus,
despite his earlier concern and criticism, he ends by putting the Court
in the same undesirable legislative posture as he found and criticized
20
in Linkletter.
19 Compare Mishkin 77 with Linkletter: "[A]fter full consideration of all the factors we
are not able to say that the Mapp rule requires retrospective application." 381 U.S. at
640. See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 4062 419 (1966).
20 The fact that Professor Mishkin would automatically apply the new law to cases
on direct review which have not yet become final does not significantly reduce this presumption for prospectivity, for it is not uncommon for new legislation expanding individual rights to be applied to all cases still on direct review. Cf. Hamm v. City of Rock
Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964 abates all criminal trespass
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This alleged inconsistency will be of little concern to those who do
not accept Professor Mishkin's symbolism rationale for preferring
retroactivity. In addition, two aspects of the Mishkin approach might
minimize the strains resulting from the exercise of a power of selective
retroactivity: (1) making criminal due process decisions retroactive
probably excites greater public hostility than does making them prospective; 2 1 (2) choosing between retroactivity and prospectivity by reference to whether a danger exists that innocent people were convicted
by the use of unreliable evidence will probably excite relatively little
public hostility. 22

On the other hand, a theory which is hard to apply yet which must
be applied frequently in controversial situations can often produce
more dissatisfaction than one which, though initially less popular, is
easier to apply. Apart from the unpopularity aspect-which, after
all, cannot be given decisive weight-a theory of selective retroactivity
raises the specter of continuous controversy over the soundness of its
application.
Shortcomings of the Reliability Test
The reliability test's uncertainty, necessity for frequent application,
and inadequacy for explaining recent decisions can best be seen by
examining Professor Mishkin's analyses of three specific rights relating
to the interrogation process: (1) the newly declared standards for
determining when a confession is coerced, to which retroactive effect
has apparently been given; 23 (2) the privilege against self-incrimination
with its no-comment corollary, to which retroactivity has just been
convictions still in the process of direct review); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 230-32
(1964) (noting that the rule of abatement applies to any proceeding which, at the time
of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court
authorized to review it, including the United States Supreme Court). See "saving clause"
discussions in Hamm, 379 U.S. at 314, 319-20, and Bell, 378 U.S. at 232-37. Moreover,
because a greater volume of cases will arise on collateral attack than are still on direct
review, prospectivity will be invoked much more often than retroactivity.
21 It should be noted, however, that Professor Mishkin's general preference for retroactivity is based on a contrary hypothesis.
22 Even strongly prosecution-oriented critics purport to condemn police practices that
raise doubts as to reliability. See INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS

14041 (1962).
23 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961). Although the point was not expressly discussed,
the cases relied upon to set aside the conviction (e.g., Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S.
62 (1949)) were all decided well after Reck's original conviction in 1936. 367 U.S. at 442.
The district court judge had denied relief because of this fact. See United States ex rel.
Reck v. Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1960).
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denied; 24 and (3) the Escobedo rule, the retroactivity of which has just
been decided by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey.2 5
1. Coerced Confessions
Professor Mishkin first notes that the Court "has made perfectly
clear that the exclusion of [coerced] confessions does not depend upon
any explicit finding or even any specific likelihood that the confession
is unreliable."2 6 Coercion does, however, produce a "significant risk"
of unreliability, and "the constitutional rules may still have an in27
tended effect upon the reliability of the guilt-determining process."
To meet the contention that the risk of unreliability under prior
authority is so negligible as not to be a significant basis for the more
recent confession rules, Professor Mishkin states: "It is in my judgment a complete answer... that the Supreme Court has ... continued
consistently to develop its rationale in terms of 'coercion,' 'involuntariness,' and 'overbearing of the will' of the defendant. It seems ap28
propriate to take the Court at its word.
Professor Mishkin's argument thus comes down to a reliance on the
Court's continuing use of the "voluntariness" terminology. But if we
are "to take the Court at its word," should we not take it at those
words which fit the facts of the recent cases, rather than rely on a
label like "voluntariness," which, as Professor Lawrence Herman has
said, "hides the values now underlying the confession rules"?2 9 In
32
31
Haynes v. Washington,3" Gallegos v. Nebraska, Spano v. New York,
and the other recent confession cases, there was, as the Court itself
indicated, no doubt as to the reliability of the confessions, nor
is there in most coerced confession cases. Indeed, in Mapp Mr. Justice
Clark stressed that "the right not to be convicted by use of a coerced
confession [exists] however logically relevant it may be and without
24 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382
U.S. 406 (1966).
25 86 Sup. Ct. 1772 (1966). Analysis of the Court's decision appears in the Epilogue.
20 Mishkin 83.

27 Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 84-85.
29 Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHio
ST. L.J. 449, 457 (1964). For a thorough demolition of voluntariness as a meaningful criterion for these cases, see Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary Confession": Some Reflections on Inbau and Reid's "Criminal Interrogationand Confessions," 17 RUTGERs L. REv.
729 (1963). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
30 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
31 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
32 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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regard to its reliability," 33 and in Malloy v. Hogan, the Court made it
clear that, as Professor Paulsen has said, "the true basis for excluding
a coerced confession is not the danger of a false confession but the
need to protect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination." 34
Protecting the privilege against self-incrimination is, as will be shown
below, frequently more likely to impair rather than to foster reliability. Thus, if we really take the Court at its word, it becomes
virtually impossible to base the retroactivity of the coerced confession
cases on a realistic concern for reliability.
Professor Mishkin's view of the confession cases does find some
modest support in Mr. Justice Clark's .attempt in Linkletter to distinguish coerced confession from search and seizure cases. Mr. Justice
Clark first denied that retroactivity was at issue at all in the confession
cases: "[T]he principle that a coerced confession is not admissible in a
trial predated the arrest as well as the original conviction in each of
[Reck v. Pate and Fay v. Noia] .

. . ."3r

He then went on to say that

reliability and "the abhorrence of society" to coerced confessions also
underlie exclusion, citing only Jackson v. Denno3 6 for the reliability
point.37 Because "there is no likelihood of unreliability or coercion
present in a search and seizure case," he concluded, the confession cases
are inapposite.38
33 567 U.S. at 656. The irrelevance of reliability to the voluntariness doctrine was
noted many years ago. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952); Lisenba
v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure,
Federalism, and Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. Rxv. 1, 26-29 (1950); McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 T-x. L. REv. 239, 240-45
(1946). For more recent confirmation, see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (consideration of truth or falsity is
"irrelevant and impermissible" in determining voluntariness, for involuntary confessions are excluded "because the methods used ... offend ... [an] underlying principle
. that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.')
There is, however, a real danger of partial unreliability. See Herman, supra note 29,
at 454 n.25. Indeed, one interrogator has confided to me that he sometimes wonders
how any confession stands up because though confessions are basically accurate, the
transcription process and the frequent absence of a stenographer, which necessitates
direct and laborious typewriter transcription by a policeman, make for numerous inaccuracies in detail. Weakness of memory and the tensions of the moment would also
seem to preclude total accuracy. The Court, however, has rarely mentioned such
problems, and this kind of partial inaccuracy, which would rarely raise significant doubts
as to guilt, would hardly be enough to justify the now extensive "voluntariness" limits on
interrogational techniques.
34 Paulsen, The Winds of Change: Criminal Procedure in New York 1941-1965, 15
BUFF. L. REv. 297, 301 (1966); see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1964).
35 381 U.S. at 638.
36 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
37 381 U.S. at 639 n.20.
38 Id. at 638.
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Mr. Justice Clark's first point seems to be that there have been no
significant changes in coercion standards since Brown v. Mississippi.39
This seems simply wrong. The difference in standards for police conduct between Brown and Stroble v. California on the one hand, and
Haynes v. Washington on the other,40 is, to say the least, quite substantial, 41 and the fact that "coerced" confessions have always been
excluded seems relatively unimportant. The second point as to the
importance of reliability would seem to support Professor Mishkin's
position but for the fact that it is not clear from the opinion whether
reliability is an indispensable element for retroactivity, or whether
society's abhorrence to such a practice is an independently sufficient
42
ground for retroactivity.
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Clark's citation of Jackson v. Denno for
the proposition that reliance is the basis for retroactivity in the confession cases seems inappropriate. Rather than dealing with the content
of the voluntariness standard, Jackson dealt with the choice of persons
constitutionally empowered to determine voluntariness-a quite different problem. And since Jackson affected only some seventeen jurisdictions, 43 it is difficult to see how it can be used to justify retroactivity
for confession cases in all jurisdictions, including those which prior to
Jackson had constitutionally correct procedures for determining volun44
tariness.
2. Self-Incrimination
The coerced confession cases indicate the inability of the reliability
rationale to explain Supreme Court decisions in one area of retro39 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
40 Compare Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.

278 (1936), with Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
41 See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 39 H~av. L. Rv. 935, 975 (1966).
42 See text accompanying notes 162-70 infra. Parenthetically, it may be noted that if
society's abhorrence is a decisive and independent factor, society has as much abhorrence
for the searching devices in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), the spike microphone
in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), the knock on the door at night, the
brazen outrages perpetrated in Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644-45, as for the "mild whip" in the
recent confession cases, like Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), which raise the
serious retroactivity problems. It is important to remember that Haynes is the relevant
confession case for comparison, and not a horrifying case like Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936), for we are concerned with the retroactivity of the recent confession cases,
not of those long past.
43 378 U.S. 368, 414-17 (1964).
44 In Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), where a conviction was upset because retroactive effect was given to new confession standards, the original trial was held under
proper procedures, for Illinois has always followed the "orthodox" or Wigmore rule.
See People v. Miller, 13 Ill. 2d 84, 96, 148 N.E.2d 455, 462 (1958); People v. Fox, 319
Ill. 606, 615-16, 150 N.E. 347, 351 (1926).
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activity problems; the self-incrimination cases, on the other hand,
demonstrate the uncertainties and difficulties of application of the
reliability approach. In addition, the facts of one self-incrimination
case, Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,45 dramatically illustrate the
artificiality of Professor Mishkin's and the Court's sharp distinction
between direct and collateral attack.
4 6 the Court held that neither prosecutors
In Griffin v. California
nor judges could draw adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to
take the stand. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion noted that comment on an accused's failure to testify
penalizes exercise of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that taking the stand will often "confuse and embarrass
. . . [a defendant] to such a degree as to increase rather than remove

prejudices against him." 47 While recognizing that reliability "is clearly
not the most generally accepted" explanation of the privilege, 48 Professor Mishkin interprets the Court's language about the defendant's
confusion and embarrassment as implying that improper denials or
curtailments of the privilege against self-incrimination affect the re49
liability of the guilt-determining process.

This January in Tehan five members of the Court seemed to accept
Professor Mishkin's overall reliability rationale, but, arguing that the
"privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," 50 they denied retroactive effect to Griffin, and by implication to Malloy. This inability of Professor Mishkin and the Court
to agree upon the proper outcome of an application of the reliability
tesC is but one reflection of the test's inherent uncertainties.
As to the merits, the Court's decision seems correct with respect to
the reliability implications of the privilege against self-incrimination
in general, but Professor Mishkin's approach seems correct with respect
to the reliability implications of comment. It seems strained to argue
that the privilege against self-incrimination in general is aimed at
ensuring reliability. Rather, as Professor Mishkin candidly concedes,
the Court has stressed the role of the privilege in protecting the accusatorial system, a system which, by concealing information, frequently
45

382 U.S. 406 (1966).

46 380 U.S. 609 (1965).

Id. at 613, citing Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
48 Mishkin 93. For the more usual explanations, see Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
49 Mishkin 92.
GO Id. at 416. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fortas did not participate; Justices
Black and Douglas dissented on the same grounds as in their dissent in Linkletter.
47
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impairs. the reliability of the guilt-determining process. 51 Indeed, even
more so than coerced confessions, evidence obtained from the mouth
or files of a defendant is likely to be reliable, and though concern
about coercive abuses may still be one of the values underlying the
privilege, 52 the privilege surely plays a very small role today in preventing such abuses.
In support of his position, Professor Mishkin points to the embarrassment and consequent prejudice which defendants may suffer when
they take the stand. That this prejudice usually produces unreliable
inferences of guilt is dubious, despite Mr. Justice Douglas' assertions
in Griffin. Moreover, a defendant who stays off the stand faces at least
as much prejudice-so much so, in fact, that probably only the fear of
even greater prejudice from the exposure of a criminal record is sufficient to persuade defendants to claim the privilege. On balance, then,
it seems likely that the privilege against self-incrimination reduces
53
rather than enhances reliability.
On the other hand, adverse comment on the exercise of the privilege
not only penalizes that exercise, but also fosters the drawing of possibly
erroneous inferences. Though a jury might draw such inferences in the
51 Privileges "do not in anywise aid the ascertainment of the truth, but rather they
shut out the light." McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx.
L. Rtv. 447 (1938); Weinstein, supra note 5, at 228 n.23, referring to "truth-hiding"
rules but agreeing with Mishkin as to retroactivity. A few common applications of the
privilege may illustrate the point without belaboring it: There is no reason to think
that books and records which are incriminating and therefore immune to a subpoena
are less reliable than those which do not incriminate. If reliability were at all involved,
we would not deny the privilege to corporations. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367,
370-71 (1951). A conviction which is precluded by an immunity statute, Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), is set aside not because guilt is at all uncertain, but
because the offense is no longer punishable. A conviction based on evidence obtained
either by an excessively narrow view of what is incriminatory, Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964), or by an immunity which is limited to the laws of another jurisdiction,
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 77-79 (1964), is set aside not because
there was too little reliable evidence of guilt, but because the tribunal was given too
much.
52 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 352 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); 8 WiGMORE, EvIDEME
317 (McNaughton rev. 1961). But see Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406,
415-16 (1966).
53 Professor Meltzer cites the danger of perjury if the defendant takes the stand as
one reason for allowing the privilege at trial. Meltzer, Required Records and the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CH. L. Rrv. 687, 692 (1951).
But the likelihood of such perjury will be considered by the jury, and the defendant's
testimony discounted. On the other hand, as the text indicates, allowing the defendant
to stay off the stand enables the jury to draw theoretically unwarranted inferences about
the defendant's guilt. It is therefore hard to see which will breed more ultimate unreliability-the danger of such discounted perjury or the danger of improper inferences
from a defendant's exercise of his privilege, which inferences probably cannot be dispelled despite instructions to the contrary.
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absence of any adverse comments, its action would not otherwise be
"judicially solemnified." Indeed, the Griffin Court expressly mentioned the danger of erroneous inferences as one of the reasons for its
decision. 54 Thus, Professor Mishkin seems correct with respect to this
facet of the privilege.
If sound, this analysis of the Griffin-Tehan problem indicates a basic
shortcoming of the reliability rationale: its effect of requiring the
Court to make difficult and controversial retroactivity analyses not only
with respect to each individual constitutional right, but also for
each facet and application of such rights. Although difficult and controversial decisions are hardly a novel experience for the Court, a
theory which greatly multiplies the necessary occasions for such decisions is not one deliberately to be sought. Indeed, a desire to avoid
the necessity of a multiplicity of analyses may well have been one
reason why the Court in Tehan dealt with the comment privilege as
a mere corollary of the privilege against self-incrimination in general,
without considering the obvious special features of the comment privilege which were expressly relied upon in Griffin.
Tehan illustrates a problem with respect to another major premise
of Professor Mishkin's approach: his assertion that there is a sharp
difference in function between direct review and habeas corpus, an
assertion which he uses to reconcile Mapp and Linkletter.55 In Tehan,
as in Linkletter, the Court seemed to adopt a similar dividing line,
for it held that the new rules it was announcing would be applied to
cases "still pending on direct review," and thus not "final," at the time
the decision was announced. Cases deemed "final" were those in which
"the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal
exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition
for certiorari finally denied, all before [the relevant date of decision]." 5
54 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Such an inference is dearly unfair
if an innocent defendant with a criminal record refrains from taking the stand for fear
that his testimony as to present innocence--which will inevitably be discounted for selfinterest-will be outweighed by the evidence of his prior record.
55 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
56 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 461 n.3 (1966). See Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965). One possible difference between Professor Mishkin's
and the Supreme Court's views is that under the latter, a new decision might apply to a
habeas corpus petition if the petition had been filed before "the time for petition for
certiorari elapsed." Under Professor Mishkin's view, the timing is not relevant but only
whether the review sought is direct or collateral. The Court was obviously not concerned
with this distinction, and its reference in Linkletter to "still pending on direct review"
cuts against this possibility.
In Johnson v. New Jersey, the Court chose not to adopt this distinction in cases
governed by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct.
1602 (1966). See text accompanying notes 226-32 infra.
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Where federal review of the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings is concerned, the making of so sharp a distinction between
review on certiorari and habeas corpus is unwarranted. There is often
no significant difference with respect to age and potential staleness
between the two types of cases. Rather than coming years after the
conviction is final, habeas corpus is often but a routine step in the
criminal defense process-the normal step taken after certiorari has
been denied. 57 Sometimes, it actually replaces certiorari, for in Fay
v. Noia58 the Supreme Court advised criminal defendants to skip
certiorari and to petition directly to the federal district court for
habeas corpus.5 9 Even in situations in which a defendant goes through
all the direct review steps, it is often nothing more than fortuitous circumstance 60 which determines whether his case is still on direct review
61
or is on collateral attack when the new decision comfes down.
The difference between review on certiorari and habeas corpus
seems ,even less significant when we look to function and actual operation. Although it is sometimes considered the "normal" method for
obtaining federal review of state convictions, certiorari does not provide, as the Court remarked in Fay v. Noia, "a normal appellate channel in any sense comparable to the writ of error," 62 for the Court must
limit its jurisdiction to questions that have significance beyond the
immediate case. Habeas corpus, on the other hand, facilitates the
Court's task in those cases it does take by providing a record focused
exclusively on the federal constitutional question. 63 Habeas corpus has
57 MFADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND CARTA 71 (1966). Even with respect to those cases not
still in litigation when the new decision comes down, the time differences are often
negligible. Thus, although Linkletter was not actively pursuing his collateral remedies on
June 19, 1961, and had not sought certiorari, a comparison of his case with Mapp shows
how insignificant the danger of staleness becomes even where the defendant has ceased
to pursue his remedies. As noted above, Linkletter's offense was actually committed at a
later date than Mapp's; final review was roughly contemporaneous; and he petitioned for
post-conviction relief "immediately" after Mapp was decided. 381 U.S. at 621, 641. Had
relief been granted, a hearing on the illegality of the search and a possible retrial would
have taken place at about the same time as any similar proceedings in Mapp.
68 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
59 Id. at 437-38.
60 These fortuities can include litigation timing, court congestion, and the Supreme
Court's choice of when to announce a new rule.
61 In Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965), a capital case,
defendant's time for certiorari ran out a few days before Escobedo was decided. Id. at
118, 213 A.2d at 671. Had the defendant filed a petition for certiorari-probably a futile
gesture at that time-he would have been entitled to consideration under Escobedo. In
Linkletter, the offense actually took place after Mrs. Mapp's alleged offense, with "final"
review roughly contemporaneous. 381 U.S. at 641. Here, too, the defendant decided not
to file a probably useless petition for certiorari. See Tehan, a particularly difficult case,
discussed in the text accompanying note 69 infra.
62 372 U.S. at 436.
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thus become the primary vehicle for immediate federal review of state
convictions. Further, this development has resulted in a gradual
shrinking of what were once significant operational differences between
review on certiorari and habeas corpus, such as the relationship to the
state proceeding,64 the degree of independent fact-finding authority,6 5
and the significance of the defendant's violation of state procedural
rules. 66 From both the functional and the operational standpoints,
then, it is justifiable to conclude that "the distinctions between habeas
corpus proceedings and direct review are largely illusory."6 7
In addition, drawing a line between review of certiorari and habeas
corpus undercuts the Supreme Court's bypass suggestion in Fay v.
63 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963); Mishkin 86-87; Freund, Remarks at Symposium on Federal Habeas Corpus, 9 UTAH L. Rav. 27, 28 (1964); cf. England v. Louisiana
Board of Medical Exalminers, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1964). For an example of an inadequately developed record, see Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958, 965-66 (1966).
64 Direct review is considered part of the original proceeding, whereas habeas corpus
is independent; communication between federal and state courts is purportedly possible
in the former but not in the latter. See Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HARv. L. Rav. 84, 120 n.106 (1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an
Abortive State Proceeding,74 HAv. L. REv. 1315, 1860-63 (1961). But as Fay v. Noia and
other cases indicate, in many cases the habeas corpus court will "remit" the case to the
state court for (a) further fact-finding, see Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 547-49
(1961); Bator, supra note 2, at 514-15; (b) an application of state law which could moot
the federal issue, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Wgrden, 240 V. Supp. 486, 490-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States ex rel. Realmuto v. Fay, 230 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); or
(c) a chance to apply subsequently developed federal law, see, e.g., United States ex rel.
Wynn v. Wilkins, 347 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1965); Miller v. Gladden, 341 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir.
1965); Calhoun v. Pate, 341 F.2d 885, 886 (7th Cir. 1965); Hunt v. Warden, 335 F.2d 936
(4th Cir. 1964); Delaney v. Gladden, 237 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Ore. 1965), with a right to reapply to the habeas court if relief is not granted. Thus, communication seems not much
less on habeas corpus than on direct review. Moreover, the result of the two forms of review is often the same: a new trial consistent with the decision of the federal court. Hart,
supra, at 120 n.106 (1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Post Conviction Remedy for
State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461, 481 n.111 (1959).
65 The habeas corpus court can take testimony and make independent findings of
fact, whereas on direct review the Supreme Court supposedly cannot. But as a practical
matter, the Supreme Court has done its own fact-finding in many direct review cases, see
Bator, supra note 2, at 514-21; Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 CoLUmr. L. REv. 943,
946 n.18 (1965); cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316 (1963), and if a full and fair state
court hearing has been held under the standards of Townsend v. Sain, the habeas corpus
court will neither review the facts too closely nor take new evidence. See Case v.
Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 345 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66 In theory, existence of an adequate and independent state procedural ground precludes direct review but has no effect on habeas corpus. But the Court's treatment of the
adequate and independent state procedural ground doctrine in Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443 (1965), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), may well have sapped that
doctrine of much of its vitality even on direct review. Hill, supra note 65, at 988-91, 993
n.205. And a vigorous application of waiver notions in habeas corpus could have the
same effect as enforcement of the adequate state ground doctrine. See id. at 984.
67 Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a
Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Cr. RLvr. 187, 234. See also Bator, supra note 2, at 517.
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Noia. If a defendant has doubts about the retroactivity of any claim
which might both affect him and be subject to Court review in the
foreseeable future, he will be well advised always to ignore the Court's
suggestion and to apply for certiorari. Many months may pass before
his petition for certiorari is rejected, and so long as it is pending, he
will be entitled to receive the benefits of any intervening decisions. As
soon as he files his petition for habeas corpus, however, even if he does
so only a day after the last state court order is entered, he will have
forfeited his right to such benefits. He will thus be put to an election
68
between delayed relief and no relief at all.
The inequity of drawing a sharp distinction between direct review
and habeas corpus is, however, only one aspect of a broader inequity:
treating two prisoners deprived of the same fundamental constitutional
right differently merely because the Supreme Court did not get around
to enunciating a particular right until after the conviction of one of
them had become final. Professor Mishkin argues that worry about this
point ignores "the reasons for barring current convictions and . . .
the fact that the new rule in no way undermines the earlier determinations of factual guilt."69 To him, it is as if a guilty person were to complain of his lot because others equally guilty were not prosecuted. 70
68 Both the unreality and the inequity of the sharp distinction between habeas corpus
and direct review are apparent in Tehan. In that proceeding, Shotts conviction was
affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1962, Shott v. State, 173 Ohio St. 542, 184 N.E2d
213 (1962), and he immediately sought Supreme Court review on both appeal and
certiorari, contending that the prosecutor's repeated comments on his failure to
take the stand when there was no other evidence deprived him of a fair trial. This was
almost 10 months before certiorari was granted in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965). Supreme Court review was denied, 373 U.S. 240 (1963), and Shott immediately
sought federal habeas corpus, raising, inter alia, the claim that the prosecutor's comment
was unconstitutional. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 4, United States ex rel. Shott v. Tehan,
337 F.2d 990 (1964). While the case was pending before the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), was decided. On the basis of Malloy,
the Court of Appeals held the comment unconstitutional and granted the writ, six
months before Griffin. United States ex rel. Shott v. Tehan, 337 F.2d 990 (1964). The
State of Ohio appealed to the Supreme Court. The latter first granted certiorari after
Griffin; then it reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that Tehan was not entitled to
"retroactive" application of Griffin.
Can it be said, in any meaningful sense, that even though certiorari had been denied,
Shott's conviction was "final" before Griffin was decided? All of these proceedings followed his original conviction in due course, without any delay. And is it not largely
fortuitous that Malloy and Griffin-not Tehan-were chosen as the declaring decisions?
Though logic may not provide a totally satisfying answer to retroactivity problems, see
Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v.
Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 650, 679 (1962), surely so fortuitous and inequitable a pattern
of results as that just outlined is unacceptable where human liberty is at stake.
69 Mishkin 88.
70 The equality argument is vividly set out and illustrated in Currier, supra note 2, at
201-04, 267-68. See also CAHN, THE SaNS oF INJUSrICE 14-15 (1949).
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And though he recognizes that such claims are sometimes sustained,7 1
he concludes that "there are certainly rational bases for drawing a line
between current convictions and those previously final," citing excerpts from Professors Bator and Amsterdam on finality. 72 Professor
Mishkin's sharp distinction between collateral attack and direct review
thus rests ultimately on finality considerations.
Finality considerations seem especially -weak where two cases differ
only in the fact that one is still on "direct" review whereas the other
is not. Where the two cases are far apart in age, finality considerations
are admittedly more persuasive. But even there, the mere timing of
the Court's decision to grant federal protection to a fundamental right
hardly seems to be a sufficient basis for unequal treatment; after all,
in most instances it was not the older prisoner's fault that the Court
did not render its decision earlier. To some extent, of course, the question comes down to a choice between the competing values of equality
and repose, and choices of this sort are notoriously immune to reasoned
resolution. It will be suggested below, 73 however, that the threat to
finality considerations from complete retroactivity appears to have
been greatly exaggerated, and if this suggestion is well taken, Professor Mishkin's rejection of equality is especially untenable.
3. The Right to Counsel-Escobedo v. Illinois
When this article was written, the retroactivity of Escobedo was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court has recently decided the
issue against retroactivity, 74 and a discussion of its decision appears
in the Epilogue. However, the original comments may still be of
value, for they raise some general issues of the administration of a
reliability rationale which may recur in future cases dealing with
federal and state court doctrines related to Escobedo,75 and which are
71 See generally Note, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal
Laws, 61 COLUM. L. RYv. 1103 (1961).
72 Mishkin 88 & n.116.
73 See text accompanying notes 122-47 infra.
74 Johnson v. New Jersey, 86 Sup. Ct. 1772 (1966). For a pre-Johnson discussion of this
problem in general agreement with the conclusions reached herein, see Note, Linkletter,
Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MicH. L. R-v. 832 (1966).
75 People v. Rivera, 16 N.Y.2d 879, 211 N.E.2d 649, 264 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1965) (People v.
Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), held not retroactive).
It should also be noted that Johnson left the states free to give Escobedo (and Miranda)
greater retroactive effect, and the considerations set forth in this section may thus be pertinent. The likelihood of such action by the states is small, however, for prior to Johnson,
few cases had given Escobedo retroactive effect. Compare United States ex rel. Walden v.
Pate, 350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965), In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 398 P.2d 380, 42 Cal. Rptr.
188 (1965), and Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1964), with United
States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965) (see particularly Forman,
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still open. Moreover, since they reach a different result from Johnson,
the original comments may serve as a partial criticism of that decision.
The problem was complicated by the uncertainties of the scope and
purpose of Escobedo. Possible readings of the case ranged from the one
extreme of a mere requirement that the defendant be notified of his
rights, to the other of a requirement that a court-appointed lawyer
be present from the moment of arrest, if not earlier. These possibilities
have been canvassed elsewhere at great length, 76 and, as will be shown
in the Epilogue, still have not been resolved.7 7 Because of these uncertainties, a full analysis of the retroactivity aspects of the case on
the basis of a theory which, like Professor Mishkin's, makes retroactivity dependent on the "intended effects" of the decision involved,
seemed and still seems somewhat premature.
A further and related complicating factor was the presence of several
potentially applicable but conflicting lines of precedent. Insofar as
Escobedo is a right to counsel case, Gideon points toward retroactivity;
insofar as it is a self-incrimination case, Tehan points toward prospectivity; and insofar as it is a coerced confession case, Reck v. Pate78 may
imply retroactivity. This article focuses on implications only of the
coerced confession and right to counsel aspects of the decision.
Though Professor Mishkin believes that coerced confession cases
should be applied retroactively, he concludes that Escobedo should
not be. He states his position thus:
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion for the Court [in Escobedo]
formally rests the decision upon the right to effective assistance of counsel. However, the discussion also brings to bear
the policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination
as well as the considerations supporting the rule against involuntary confessions. Though these latter doctrines may be
regarded as indirectly relevant, indicating some of the ways in
which assistance of counsel may help preserve an individual's
other constitutional rights, it is possible that they have independent significance in the holding as well. But regardless
C.J., concurring at 442-43), vacated, 34 U.S.L. WEEx 3425 (June 20, 1966), United States
ex rel. Walker v. Fogliani, 343 F.2d 43, 47 (9th Cir. 1965), and Miller v. Warden, 338 F.2d
201 (4th Cir. 1964).
76 E.g., Herman, supra note 28; Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in KAMISAR, INBAU & ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSnCE
IN OUR TrME (1965) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar, Equal Justice]; Developments in the
Law-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 935, 996-1023 (1966); Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the
Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1964).
77 See text accompanying notes 241-43 infra.
78 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
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of the precise relevance of these doctrines to the holding, it is
clear that the constitutional objectives of Escobedo lie primarily in the direction of protecting human integrity and
dignity rather than of increasing the reliability of the processes for determining guilt. It should be remembered, in
this connection, that any confession to the police was already
subject to exclusion if found to be involuntary under previous authority, itself quite far-reaching in its protections.
Escobedo's added reach thus does not seem principally aimed
at improving the trustworthiness of suspects' statements;
protection of personal dignity and integrity, within the framework of an adversary system, seems a far more satisfactory
9
rationale
It is difficult to understand how Professor Mishkin can so quickly
dismiss the coerced confession and privilege aspects of Escobedo. As
to the first, the only one to be discussed here, one of the most common
explanations of Escobedo-an explanation relied upon by both proponents and opponents of retroactivity8 -was that the decision was designed primarily to eliminate the possibility of coerced confessions by
preventing the creation of coercive environments. A related common
explanation was that the case was a reaction to the Court's inability to
penetrate the interrogation room to determine whether the confessions
before it were indeed voluntary.8 ' Thus, at least part of Escobedo's
protection of "personal dignity and integrity" during the interroga82
tion process was seen as being aimed at the prevention of coercion.
The recognition of such an aim implies a view that situations which
do not comply with Escobedo's requirements are likely to be coercive,
and that the absence of impartial witnesses from such situations not
79 Mishkin 95.

80 Compare In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 376-78, 398 P.2d 380, 886-88, 42 Cal. Rptr.
188, 194-96 (1965), and United States ex rel. Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240, 242 (7th Cir.
1965), with United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429, 442-43 (3d Cir. 1965)
(Forman, C.J., concurring), vacated, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3425 (June 20, 1966).
81 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429, 443 (3d Cir. 1965)
(Foreman, C.J., concurring), vacated, 34 U.S.L. WrEK 3425 (June 20, 1966); In re Lopez,
62 Cal. 2d 368, 374-75, 398 P.2d 380, 384-85, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 192-93 (1965); Developments
in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARv.L. REv. 935, 963 (1966). Professors Mishkin and Amsterdam in their brief for the American Civil Liberties Union in Miranda stressed the link
between Escobedo and coercion, stating that: "The step from Haynes to Escobedo is an
extremely short one, if, indeed, one at all. If Haynes represents the capstone of the 'involuntary' confession cases, then Escobedo represents the application of this capstone in
light of the full Fifth Amendment protection held to be applicable to State interrogation
by Malloy." Brief for A.C.L.U. as Intervenor, p. 21. Professor Mishkin has written me that
this brief represents what he takes Escobedo to mean. In Miranda, the Court adopted the
basic approach and many of the details of the A.C.L.U. brief.
82 Cf. Enker & Flsen, supra note 76, at 66-67.
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only increases the likelihood of coercion, 83 but also ensures that the
courts cannot know whether coercion took place. Analogy to Gideon
has suggested the question:
Would it be too strained to argue that just as the great difficulty of proving what legal defenses a lawyer might have
made and what facts he might have marshalled casts a shadow
over the conviction of every uncounselled defendant, so the
great difficulty of proving what the police did or threatened
or promised in the secret interrogation proceedings raises
doubts about the reliability of every confession obtained from
a suspect denied counsel?84
On the other hand, the institution of an additional protection
against coerced confessions does not logically require the conclusion
that all or even most confessions taken without this protection are
likely to be coerced. And it does seem somewhat strained to argue that
the reliability of confessions taken without a lawyer is as suspect as
the reliability of trials conducted without a lawyer. But reliability
is not the only or even the main purpose of the coerced confession
rule.85 Other values subsumed under the term "voluntariness" include
the deterrence of improper police pressure and the prevention of ignorant, duped, or compelled waivers of the privilege against selfincrimination. The likelihood of violating these values in the interrogation process is far from negligible 86-in fact, it is probably
greater than the likelihood of obtaining unreliable confessions.8 7 And
whatever the values sought to be protected by the rule against coerced
confessions, the Supreme Court must have thought they were receiving extremely inadequate protection prior to Escobedo, for
Escobedo is, as the Court itself recognized, 88 rather strong medicine.
Since a remedy so drastic seems appropriate only for a very serious
83

See

INBAU & RID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1

(1962), stating that

privacy is indispensable to effective interrogation.
293-94 (1965) (emphasis in original).
85 See text accompanying notes 26-43 supra.
86 INBAU & REID, supra note 83, at 1-139, describes a full array of the interrogational
techniques and pressures that facilitate the violation of these values. See also O'HARA,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INTERROGATION, ch. 9 (1956). Both of these manuals were
quoted extensively and critically by the Court in Miranda. 86 Sup. Ct. at 1614-17.
87 But see authorities cited notes 29 & 34 supra for the possibility of partial inaccuracy.
88 See 378 U.S. at 488-90, recognizing that the number of confessions obtained might
be fewer under the decision. The Court could probably have decided the case in the
same way on a traditional "voluntariness" rationale, on the facts of the case. See Herman,
supra note 28, at 472-73. A decision on voluntariness grounds would have had a much
lighter impact.
84 HALL & KAMisAR, BASIc CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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problem, the Court must have thought that the likelihood of improper
pressure in secret interrogations was considerable. Thus, if Professor
Mishkin's comment that "pre-Escobedo authority already provided for
the exclusion of the vast bulk of confessions having substantial likelihood of being untrustworthy in fact" 9 is meant to be interpreted as
saying that pre-Escobedo authority successfully excluded "the vast
bulk of confessions having any substantial likelihood" of having been
obtained in violation of the other values subsumed under the term
"voluntariness," it is clearly a minority view.
Though coerced confession cases loomed large in the background,
Escobedo was actually decided under the sixth amendment as a case
involving the right to counsel at the early stages of the criminal
process. The Court had already decided that the right to counsel at
a later stage of that process is to be given retroactive effect, 90 and Professor Mishkin approves of this decision. Thus, his rejection of retroactivity for Escobedo implies a belief that different stages of the criminal process have different right-to-counsel retroactivity aspects,
depending, apparently, on the significance of counsel's presence to the
guilt-determining and fact-finding functions of the different stages.
Surely, this further multiplication of problems91-- problems so difficult
that Professor Mishkin devotes more than one-seventh of his article
to Escobedo alone-does not further the goals set forth by him in his
Part I and makes his test all the more difficult to apply.
Moreover, is Escobedo so different from Gideon and the other rightto-counsel cases? Although the discussion to this point has focused on
Escobedo's importance to coercion and self-incrimination, the opinion's structure and precedents support a broader role for the right to
counsel. The opinion can be broken down into two parts. The first
sets out an affirmative statement of precedents and policy, 92 while the
second replies to arguments that the presence of counsel has unduly
harmful effects on interrogation. 93 In its first part, the opinion relies
89 Mishkin 96-97.
90 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Picklesimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2
(1963) (per curiam).
91 For example, is Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), closer to Gideon than
to Escobedo? What of Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), or White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963)? A recent commentator speculates that all of these will be granted
full retroactivity. Note, Linkletter, Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64
MICH. L. REv. 832, 843 (1966). See also McWilliams v. Gladden, 407 P.2d 833, 840 (Ore.
1965) (dissenting opinion). But see United States ex rel. Romano v. Fay, 360 F.2d 389 (2d
Cir. 1966) (Massiah held not retroactive).
92 378 U.S. at 484-88.
93 Id. at 488-92.
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almost exclusively on sixth amendment authorities: Massiah,94 the
concurrence in Spano,95 Powell, 5 Hamilton,97 White,98 the New York
decision in Donovan,99 and Gideon.100 One implication of this reliance
is a view that Escobedo extends a full right to counsel to the accusatory stage of the criminal process. This right is designed not only to
prevent coerced confessions and protect the privilege against selfincrimination, but also to ensure the giving of any and all other ser'10 1
vices that a lawyer might be able to offer at such a "critical stage.
These might include explaining to the defendant the significance of
what is happening so that he knows exactly what he faces, bargaining
for the defendant with the police,1 0 2 assisting the defendant in making
exculpatory statements, 10 3 preventing against unfair lineups, 1° 4 guarding against errors or overreaching in transcription, 10 5 and perhaps

even advising a plea or a confession. 0 6 In short, a lawyer can perform
at the accusatory stage whatever services lawyers are normally called
94 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
95 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring).
96 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
97 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
98 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam).
99 People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
100 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
101 Enker & Elsen, supra note 76, at 69; Comment, The Curious Confusion Surrounding
Escobedo v. Illinois, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 560 (1965). The New York cases, in relying
explicitly on both the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination,
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), have indicated
that other services were also involved: "[O]ne of the most important protections which
counsel can confer while his client is being detained ... is to .. . prevent the deprivation
of [the privilege against self-incrimination] and other rights which may ensue from such
detention." Id. at 151-52, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (emphasis added).
102 Kamisar, Equal Justice 37-38. This is more likely to take place in the District
Attorney's office.
103 See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 594 (1961); Kamisar, Equal Justice 16. The
lawyer may be particularly necessary in helping to explain noncriminal but nevertheless
suspicious conduct. It would be better to do this in the police station rather than in
the District Attorney's office, contrary to the plea situation, in order to prevent the
making of a formal arrest.
104 Cf. Wade v. United States, 358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1966) (eyewitness saw defendant
alone in custody of police before identifying him in lineup); United States ex rel.
Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 744 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. granted,
34 U.S.L. WEEK 3429 (June 20, 1966). Both cases involve post-indictment lineups. See
also Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966); People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 47
Cal. Rptr. 909, 920-21 (1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. VEK 3418 (June 14, 1966).
105 See authorities cited notes 29 & 34 supra for the danger of partial inaccuracy.
106 See the comments of Mr. Justice Fortas on oral argument of Miranda v. Arizona,
34 U.S.L. NV=. 3299 (March 8, 1966); Kamisar, Equal Justice 37; Note, An Historical
Argument for the Right to Counsel at Interrogation, 73 YAiE L.J. 1000, 1049 (1964).
Advising a plea may also be unlikely at so early a stage.
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on to perform, not the least of which is simply to be there at a critical
moment, even if relatively passive.' 07
The absence of some of these legal services, such as guidance in
making a statement, assistance with exculpatory statements, and prevention of unfair lineups, can affect reliability. Professor Mishkin
recognizes some reliability implications of the presence of counsel, 08s
but because he does not envisage so broad a role for counsel, he does
not consider reliability to be overly significant in Escobedo. If the
notion of a broad role for counsel in the accusatory stage is accepted,
however, retroactivity would seem as appropriate for Escobedo as for
Gideon, even under a reliability rationale.
4. Summary
These varied and numerous uncertainties point up a basic shortcoming of Professor Mishkin's thesis that constitutional rights should
be given retroactive application only when one of their "intended
effects" serves to further reliability. Constitutional rights often further
a variety of purposes, 0 9 and a specific situation or problem may raise
a variety of constitutional rights. 10 The strands of doctrine and policy
in constitutional due process rights are often numerous, tangled, and
uncertain in scope, and the significance of any particular strand is
often hard to assess."' Yet, Professor Mishkin's approach expressly
requires that this extremely difficult task be undertaken with respect
to every distinct facet and application of every right, often soon after
the right has been declared and before uncertainties have been re107 This broader notion of the right to counsel is really not altogether novel. It
goes back to Powell v. Alabama, 287 US. 45 (1932), which referred to the need for the
guidance of counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings, without indicating any
limitation of counsel's function. See Kamisar, Equal justice 56. On the other hand, many
lawyers will simply tell their clients to keep silent, and nothing more will be involved.
108 Mishkin 96-99.
109 Consider the range of possible contexts in which the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel may apply.
110 Thus, police station interrogation raises self-incrimination, right to counsel and
due process voluntariness considerations; for the possible constitutional issues raised by
entrapment, see Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional
Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE J. 942 (1965).
1l Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), is a particularly good example of this. See also
Kamisar, Equal Justice 6-9, on the ramifications of Griffin v. Illinois, 851 U.S. 12 (1956),
and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The difficulty of weighing the importance
of any particular element in the decision is one reason why that decision cannot be made
immediately, as has been suggested. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CAur. L. Rxv. 929, 940 n.64 (1965). Delay is necessary under any theory
which allows retroactivity only to those decisions based on a particular rationale, for it
may not be possible to determine whether a new decision falls within that rationale until
the ramifications of the new decision are clarified.
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duced. The difficulties and perplexities set forth above will thus be
encountered again and again.
Moreover, the courts will face problems in dealing with rights which
do not fit easily into the Mishkin dichotomy. Professor Mishkin discusses only procedural due process and not equal protection, and thus
a separate analysis may be needed for the latter area. 112 And what of
such rights as cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy?" 3
Neither of these rights affects in any significant sense the reliability
of the guilt-determining process, but surely we do not want to acquiesce in the continued imposition of a penalty we now consider too
cruel or the continued punishment of a person tried twice for the
same offense. To cover these and similar rights, then, we will need
different analyses. 114
Nor can such distinctions and refinements be limited to the interjurisdictional retroactivity context. Professor Mishkin's analysis is explicitly based not on considerations peculiar to retroactivity in a
changing law context, but rather on the function of habeas corpus in
assuring procedural due process in all contexts. Thus, it would seem
to include intrajurisdictional cases even where old standards are involved. On his view of the function of habeas corpus, Professor Mishkin would always deny relief to intrajurisdictional cases not involving
rights affecting reliability, for the alternate purpose of habeas corpus
-supervising state application of federal law-would not be relevant." 5 Yet, habeas corpus relief has been granted to federal prisoners
raising claims not involving the reliability of the fact-finding process,
such as search and seizure, 116 double jeopardy, 117 substantive uncon112 See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447 n.13 (1962); cf. Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
113 The Court has just granted certiorari in a case raising the question of whether
the fourteenth amendment incorporates the double jeopardy provision of the fifth.
Cichos v. Indiana, 86 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1966). See United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins,
348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965). The cruel and unusual punishment clause is already absorbed. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947) (dictum).
114 Indeed, in light of Professor Mishkin's overriding concern for the reliability aspects
of due process, can he justifiably limit habeas corpus to constitutional errors affecting
reliability? Why not all such errors, including improperly admitted or excluded evidence,
newly discovered evidence, and errors respecting the scope of cross-examination?
115 See, e.g., Mishkin 77 n.71, 89 n.118.
116 The availability of post-conviction relief for search and seizure claims is still
disputed. See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 378 (1964).
117 Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) (indictment for offense already punished);
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) (multiple punishment).
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stitutionality on the face of the statute,".8 and defects in the indictment,119 and the Supreme Court has given no indication that habeas
corpus relief is narrower in scope for federal prisoners than for state
prisoners. Indeed, the Court in Sunal v. Large and Fay v. Noia intimated that habeas corpus relief might be broader for federal prisoners. 120 The present scope of habeas corpus relief is far from clear, and
adoption of the Mishkin approach, which would require a multiplicity
of rationales and distinctions, would make this "untidy area of the
law' ' 121 even more untidy.
To sum up, Professor Mishkin's approach is difficult to apply but
requires frequent application; rests on artificially sharp and often
inequitable distinctions between collateral attack and direct review;
and is too limited in scope to offer adequate explanations of certain
areas of constitutional criminal procedure. An approach containing so
many defects requires many offsetting benefits indeed.
Finality
The benefits Professor Mishkin finds in his approach all relate to
the attainment of finality. Consequently, analysis is required of the
force and weight of considerations of finality.
A vigorous argument for finality has been made by Professors Paul
Bator and Anthony Amsterdam, both of whom are quoted approvingly and extensively by Professor Mishkin. 12 2 In explaining "why...
[we] seek a point at which . . .a judgment becomes final," Professor
Bator mentions:
[1] Conservation of . . . all of the intellectual, moral and
political resources involved in the legal system ....
[2] [There is] nothing more subversive of a judge's sense of
responsibility . . . than an indiscriminate acceptance of
the notion that all shots will always be called by someone
else ....
[3] [I]t is essential to the education and deterrent functions
118 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). Compare Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and
Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 378, 384 n.30 (1964), with Bator, Finality
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. R v. 441,

474 (1963).
119 Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
For listings of cases in which habeas corpus relief has been granted to federal prisoners,
see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 414, 409 n.17, 410 nn.20-21 (1963); Student Symposium,
Post-Conviction Remedies-The Federal Approach: Constitutional Grounds for Relief,
27 OHIo ST. L.J. 321 (1966); Note, The Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts,
35 CoLum. L. REv. 404 (1935). See also Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
120 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 412 (1963); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 179-80 (1947).
121 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
122 Mishkin 77 n.71, 80 n.80.
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of the criminal law that we be able to say that one violating that law will swiftly and certainly be subject to punishment, just punishment ....
[4] Repose is a psychological necessity in a secure and active
society . . . [although this is] not [to] counsel a smug

acceptance of injustice merely because it is disturbing to
1 23
worry about whether injustice has been done.

He then suggests certain limitations on finality to ensure the preservation of fairness and jurisdictional competence in the corrective
24
process.
Professor Bator's four considerations are all obviously important,
but his estimate of the damage that easily available federal habeas
corpus would cause to them seems exaggerated. First, there is little
indication so far that our "intellectual, moral and political resources"
have been strained by the increased number of state habeas corpus
petitions. 125 Since most petitions are denied out of hand without even
a hearing, 126 and since hearings, when held, are usually brief, there
would seem to be little real strain on our physical resources. As -to the
other kinds of resources, it is difficult to pin down the existence of any
such strain. Indeed, it could be argued that continued and frequent
consideration of constitutional claims will strengthen our moral and
123 Bator, supra note 117, at 451-53.
124 Id. at 453-62.
125 See Gellhorn, Remarks at Symposium on Habeas Corpus, 9 UTAH L. R;-'.

31, 32-33
(1964).
126 In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, 468 hearings were held in 88 federal district courts on state habeas corpus proceedings. This constituted 11% of the total petitions filed. Letter from J. F. Spaniol, Jr., Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, to
the author, April 27, 1966. While this averages out to 5 or 6 per year for the 88 districts,
some districts have much more. Thus, between July 1964 and November 1965, 200
habeas corpus petitions were filed and 52 hearings held in the Western District of New
York, the location of Attica State Prison, a maximum security prison. The two judges
in this district averaged about 20 hearings per year; a third judge will soon be added,
reducing each judge's load by a third. In fiscal 1965, in eight of the twelve districts
listed by Justice Walter V. Schaefer as handling two-thirds of all petitions, Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 21 n.79 (1956), 40 judges
held approximately 188 hearings in 1159 cases. Letters to the author from clerks of the
Northern District of California, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Eastern District of
Illinois, Northern District of Illinois, Northern District of New York, District Court of
Kansas, Northern District of Indiana, and Eastern District of Washington. In other
jurisdictions, the burden is lighter. See Caffrey, The Impact of the Townsend and Noia
Cases on Federal District Judges, 33 F.R.D. 446 (1963). In many instances, the number
can be further reduced by imaginative handling. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,
122-23 (1963); Pope, Suggestions for Lessening the Burden of Frivolous Applications, 83
F.R.D. 409 (1962). Most hearings are apparently quite short. Gellhorn, supra note 125,
at 32-33; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108
U. PA. L. Raw. 461, 478 (1960). See also Note, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners,52 VA. L. Rav. 486, 491-97 (1966), for a recent statistical study to the same
effect.
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intellectual resources. After all, the Supreme Court's recent expansion
of individual rights has certainly made not only the courts, but also
the bar and lay public, more sensitive to due process considerations.
Second, no one has ever called for indiscriminate acceptance of the
notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else. Federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners is limited to constitutional issues, and
127
since the shots are called under the standards of Townsend v. Sain,
state court rulings based on full and fair evidentiary hearings are routinely affirmed. 12s On the other hand, the possibility of some second
guessing has certainly prdduced an increased sensitivity to constitu29
tional rights on the part of state courts.
Third, we currently know too little about and do too little for prisoner education and deterrence to warrant firm judgments that liberal
habeas corpus impairs those objectives. 30 It seems especially unlikely
that the federal post-conviction remedy operates as a significant factor
in view of the far greater number of state post-conviction petitions
filed by most long term prisoners.
Finally, repose seems something less than "a psychological necessity,"
for so long as a person is kept in prison, the matter is final neither for
him nor for the society that keeps-and supports-him there.' 8 1
127 372 U.S. 293 (1963). This case was decided after Professor Bator's article was
published.
128 Id. at 312-18; see Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 345 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). The need to exhaust state remedies also minimizes federal intervention. A
cursory survey of the advance sheets indicates that the federal courts have tried to
ensure that state courts have an opportunity to decide the questions that are raised. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Dalton v. Myers, 342 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1965); United States
ex rel. Walker v. Fogliani, 343 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Calhoun v.
Pate, 341 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1965).
Professor Gellhorn has also noted how rarely state court convictions are set aside, but
his figures relevant'to 1959 may be a bit obsolete. See Gelhorn, supra note 125, at 33.
See also Reitz, supra note 126, at 486-87.
129 See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965); Schaefer, supra note 126, at 16-17; cf.
Reitz, supra note 126, at 469, 487.
180 See SYFss, TBm Socsmr oF CArriv.s .10-12 (Atheneum ed. 1965); Bennett, Our
Penal System: Does it Deter Violence?, 4 Am. CRim. L.Q. 68 (1966). Professor Paul Freund
has commented that filing habeas corpus petitions may actually have a positive therapeutic and educational effect on prisoners. Moreover, much of our crime is committed
by the underprivileged and disadvantaged, those who find society cruel, unfair, and
hypocritical. The concern for equal justice reflected in a system which does not forget
such people but continues to attempt to rectify any injustice they may have suffered can
also have a significantly deterrent and educational effect. On the other hand, rehabilitation
is seriously hindered if a prisoner feels he has been the victim of inequitable treatment.
See NEWmAN, CONvIcON 43 (1966).
131 Cf. United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 25 (2d Cir. 1964) (Marshall,
J., dissenting), aff'd, 381 U.S. 654 (1965); Meador, Habeas Corpus and the "Retroactivity"
Illusion, 50 VA. L. REv. 1115, 1117 (1964). Though this can be said for the accused in
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Professor Amsterdam stresses the administrative inconvenience and
impaired reliability of a hearing or new trial many years after the
event. 13 2 At first blush, considerations of impaired reliability seem important, but if one considers the fallibility of both the fact-finding
and judgmental criminal processes, 13 3 and takes into account the
waste of valuable human resources implicit in any penal system, the
balance of social utility and overall reliability is far from clear.
Supporting, and perhaps underlying, the above finality considerations is a further concern: the fear of a legalized mass jail break by
rapists, murderers, and other felons. 134 This fear is reflected in the
concern expressed in Tehan about the possibility of unsuccessful retrials of all defendants who did not take the stand in six states, 135 and
in Mr. Justice Clark's comment in Linkletter that prior police lawlessness would not be deterred "by the wholesale release of the guilty
36

victims."1

The concern expressed in Tehan seems well-founded, 37 though a
harmless error rule, which the Court is apparently considering for
every adverse judgment of continuing significance, the fundamental difference between
continuing imprisonment and other continuing effects needs no elaboration. This, of
course, is one reason why res judicata does not apply to habeas corpus. Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). See also id. at 8: "Conventional notions of finality of litigation
have no place when life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights
132 Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
383-84 (1964) (quoted at Mishkin 77 n.71):
The . . . characteristics of collateral litigation (which] may be denominated
aspects of a "finality" factor . . . involve (a) duplication of judicial effort;
(b) delay in setting the criminal proceeding at rest; (c) inconvenience and possibly danger in transporting a prisoner to the sentencing court for hearing;
(d) postponed litigation of fact, hence litigaon n which will often be less reliable respecting
in producng
(i) respecting the post-conviction claim itself, and
(ii)
the the
issuefacts
of gilt if the collateral attack succeeds in a form
which allows retrial (the burden of proofit o
n retrial, of course, remaincollateral
ciaim,
ing with the
prosecutor).
In combination, these finality considerations amount
the strength
of
the
the
claim,
argument
theless
manner
to a more or
persuasive
against
thedepending
cognizability
of any particular
of itsargument
treatment
(if any)
upon
in the conviction
theproceedings,
nature of
and the
ircumstances under which collateral
litigation must be had.
133 For a urvey of the system's fallibility, see Weinstein,
Some Diffculties in Devising
The
Rulesfallibility
for Determining
Truth
extends not
Trials,of66 COLUM. L. RL~v. 225, 229-41l (1966).
onlyintoJudicial
the question
guilt
of some crime, but also to the
particular crime committed, and
to the basis for and length
of the sentence, ali of
which are significant in determining
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at the time habeas
corpus relief
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198'34(1965);
See, e.g.,
In re Lopez,v. 62Negri,
Commonwealth
Cal. 419
2d 368,
381, 125,
398 P.2d
380, 390, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188,
Pa. 117,
213 A.2d
670, 676 (1965) (concurring opinion); Brief for the State
of New York and Other States
as Aicus Curiae, pp.
45-46, Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup.
Ct. 1602 (1966).
'35 382 U.S. at 418-19 (1966).
196 381 US. at
637 (1965).

187 But see Mishkin 94 n.142.
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Griffin,138 might minimize problems. But insofar as the comment rule
is concerned, the possibility of a legalized mass jail break would seem
to be simply part of the price we must now pay for former failures to
provide fair procedures, for here if anywhere the effect on the reliability of the guilt-determining process is clear. On the other hand,
it seems unlikely that many prisoners would be released by the retroactive allowance of claims of illegal search and seizure. 39 For one
thing, since a good proportion of search and seizure cases involve minor
narcotics or gambling offenses, many of the victims of illegal searches
are likely to be out of prison now that five full years have passed since
Mapp.14o For another, cases in which a guilty plea was entered are generally immune from collateral attack. 141
Doubts have also been expressed that many prisoners would be released by a retroactive application of Escobedo.142 Though uncertainties about the reach of Escobedo make assured judgment as difficult
here as elsewhere, some of the factors previously discussed with respect
to search and seizure would seem equally relevant here. 43 Moreover,
it is now clear that far fewer convictions result solely from confessions
than was formerly thought'4 4 and that retrials may be successful in
many cases.
138 See Chapman v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1228 (1966) (whether harmless error rule
should apply to Griflin). Compare State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 590-91, 206 A.2d 737,
747 (1965), aff'd on other grounds, sub nom. Johnson v. New Jersey, 86 Sup. Ct. 1772
(1966). For problems with one harmless error rule, see HALL & KAMISAR, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 299-300 (1965).
139 See SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAv OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 124 (1964). But
see Brief for the State of New York, supra note 134, at 46 n.1; Allen, Federalism and the
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 43 n.204.
140 The median length of detention for prisoners released from New York State's
maximum security prisons was less than 33 months; the median length for all New York
State prisoners was only 24.7 months. Only 472 of 3701 prisoners released from the New
York State maximum security prisons in 1964 had been in for five years or longer; for all
New York State prisoners, the figures are 515 of 4052. Letter from New York State
Department of Correction to the author, May 19, 1966. The national median of time
served for all felony offenders in state prisons in 1960 was 16.7 months, with only 8.7%
serving five or more years. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONEi STATISTICSCHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PRISONERS: 1960, 26-27 (1965).
141 E.g., Watts v. United States, 278 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
142 See Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 126, 213 A.2d 670, 679-80 (1965) (Roberts,
J., dissenting); Note, Linkletter, Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64
MICH. L. Rav. 832, 849-54 (1966).
143 See text accompanying notes 140-41 supra.
144 See Remarks of Judge Sobel, Symposium-Should Confessions Be Abolished?, 2
Crim. L. Bull., March 1966, pp. 13-16; Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General
Behind? (pt. 2), 155 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1966 p. 4 n.29; cf. Ritz, State Criminal Cases:
Subsequent Developments in Cases Reversed by the United States Supreme Court and
Some Current Problems, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 202 (1962). But see Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 935, 942-43 (1966) (criticizing the implications drawn by Judge Sobel from his statistics). Conversations with local law enforce-
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An obvious yet sometimes overlooked aspect of the mass jail break
concern also merits mention. Habeas corpus relief rarely means the
thrusting onto society of menaces who otherwise would have been permanently incarcerated. Relatively few prisoners are in for life, 145 and
even though habeas corpus relief is usually granted only to very serious
offenders, 146 it still remains true that by the time all state and federal
remedies and appeals have been exhausted, most prisoners have relatively little time left to serve. 47 In practice, habeas corpus often shortens a prisoner's detention minimally.
To summarize, some releases-often of serious offenders-would be
inevitable under a policy of full retroactivity. Nevertheless, there is
little evidence to indicate that the number of releases under such a
policy would be so great as to justify the fears of mass jail break.

III.

AN ALTERNATE THEoRY OF RETROACTIVITY
AND HABEAS CORPUS

Despite all that has been said above, some difficulties would surely
result from the upsetting of old convictions. Why then should we apply
new criminal procedure standards to release men who received trials
in accordance with law as it was then understood, who are probably
guilty at least of some offense, and whose guilt is no less certain now
than then? Can we continue to reopen old cases in "a perpetual and
unreasoned anxiety"' 4 8 to achieve perfect justice? Since this article is
intended primarily as a critical comment on Professor Mishkin's reliability approach, a fully developed answer will not be presented. Nevertheless, the premises of such an answer will now be suggested.
The Nature of the Rights
Regardless of whether they affect reliability or personal dignity,
newly declared constitutional criminal procedure rights have one imment officials confirm the view that confessions are not as important as had been
assumed, particularly in important cases, where thorough investigations by elite officers
are made and other evidence is often obtained. According to some of these informants,
the need for confessions is greatest in the numerous burglary and larceny cases, where
elaborate investigations are uneconomical and where confederates are sought; others
stress the importance of confessions in rape cases, in part because of the need for
corroboration.
145 See note 140 supra.
146 See Reitz, supra note 126, at 484.
147 Id. at 484-85. The average postconviction proceeding is likely to take approximately
two years until all appeals are heard. For disturbed comments about the lengthening
time now required for adjudication of habeas corpus petitions, despite the intended
promptness and efficiency of this remedy, see MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA

71 (1966).
148 Bator, supra note 117, at 453.
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portant characteristic in common: they are constitutional rights, reflecting fundamental norms of the process by which a constitutional
democracy goes about the grave and unhappy business of depriving
one of its members of his life, his liberty, or his property. Although
perhaps not universally valid, 149 such rights are so fundamental to our
legal system as to be a part of our basic charter and immune to ordinary
legislative change. 150 They are not newly created as by legislative enactment, or newly relevant through a change in social or legal circumstances. Their roots go deep in our history, and many have been
included in federal and state constitutions since the Revolution. As
Professor Kurland has noted, "the Court has not yet withdrawn from
the definition of due process .. .in Palko .. . [as] includ[ing] only

those things that are of the very essence 'of a scheme of ordered
liberty'."'151 Surely criminal due process principles are no less essential
to "ordered liberty" merely because the trials in which they should
have been applied occurred some years ago.
Since newly declared constitutional criminal procedure rights "are
of the very essence of.. . 'ordered liberty,' " states should not be allowed to continue to deprive persons of their freedom on the basis of
proceedings now considered contrary to "the kind of fair trial which
is this country's constitutional goal."'152 The point can best be illustrated by brief examination of some newly declared rights. Thus, if
the accusatorial system and the privilege against self-incrimination are
indeed of the essence of our system of criminal justice,'153 was a trial
which forced the accused to "shoulder .. .[some of the]

. ..

load"'154

any less a violation of that system merely because it happened five
or even twenty-five years ago? 155 Did comment on a defendant's failure
149 But see Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling,
51 VA. L. REv. 201, 266 (1965). Such universal validity could not possibly be claimed for
the accusatorial nature of our system of criminal justice, although it is one of the
system's fundamental aspects. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949); cf.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
150 Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 56 (1899).
151 Kurland, Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in the United States: "The Noble
Lie," in THE GREAT CHARTER 48, 68 (1965). A commentator has described due process

as referring to rights the violation of which either "shock[s] the conscience of mankind"
or is "unfair or uncivilized." Henkin, "Selective Incorporation"in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 76, 78 (1963).
152 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
153 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
154 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
155 Indeed, despite dicta to that effect, the Court had never held that the states were
not required to allow a privilege against self-incrimination. The Court had only held
that the no comment rule was not required of the states. See Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Henkin, supra note 151,
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to take the stand do any less damage to the privilege or to the reliability
of the fact-finding process then than now? Has it not always been
wrong to compel a man to incriminate himself, or to allow him, because of ignorance, to waive his rights either in the police station or
in court? Has there even been a time when special handicaps imposed
by poverty or race were not fundamentally wrong? Can a trial in which
the defendant was deprived of the right of confrontation ever have
been fair? Can our legal system ever allow the perpetuation of a conviction based on the kind of "conscience-shocking" conduct found in
Rochin v. California?58 If it is now said that defendants need a lawyer
at every critical stage in the criminal process from interrogation to
appeal, has this not always been true? After all, some of the principles
of even so controversial a decision as Escobedo are reflected in the statutes of many states. 157 And even if Escobedo is to be read as requiring
the presence of a lawyer from the moment of arrest, is it an especially
novel thought that, as a matter of fairness, a man facing an adversary
in a legal encounter affecting life and liberty should have the assistance of a lawyer at all critical moments?158
The truth is, I think, that recent decisions have not discovered or
created new rights; rather, they have only granted new federal remedies for old wrongs. These remedies have been granted only recently
not because the rights they protect are newly conceived or newly relevant, but rather because concern for considerations of federalism has
lessened 59 and perhaps because sensitivity to due process problems
has increased. But the newness of the remedy does not eliminate the
faults of the condemned proceeding, for just as we cannot tolerate
the continued imprisonment of a man whose conviction was based on
unreliable evidence, so we cannot tolerate the continued imprisonment of a man whose conviction failed in other respects to meet the
fundamental legal standards of the community.
The "declaration" of new constitutional criminal procedure rights
is thus an illustration of Professor Mishkin's comment in Part I of his
article: "[E]ven when 'new law' must be made, it is often in fact a
at 81. Similarly, in Palko the Court did not hold that the states could ignore double
jeopardy considerations, but only that the particular statute allowing a state to appeal
a criminal conviction was not in violation of principles of ordered liberty. It expressly
reserved broader questions. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
156 342 U.S. 165, 166, 172-73 (1952).
157 See A.L.I. MoDs. CODE OF PRE-ARAIG IFNT PRocanuax, App. V (Tent. Draft No.

1, 1966).
See Kamisar, Equal Justice 36-37; Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 HAIv. L.
CANONS OF PROFFSSIONAL ETHics, Canon 9, quoted in Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 n.7 (1964).
159 See generally Allen, supra note 139.
158

R . 21, 37 (1965); cf. ABA
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matter of the court articulating particular clear implications of values
so generally shared in our society . . .that the process might well be

characterized as declaring a preexisting law."' 6 0
That the Court itself often views its innovating function from this
perspective is evidenced by its persistent efforts to trace the historical
roots of the rights it is "declaring."' 61 Moreover, there is an element
of support for a broad theory of retroactivity in Mr. Justice Clark's
intimation in Linkletter that, apart from unreliability, "the abhorrence
of society" to coerced confessions is a reason for giving retroactive
effect to coerced confession cases. 162 Since the "abhorrence" alluded to
includes "so mild a whip" as was exercised in Haynes, it would appear
clearly abhorrent to keep a man in jail when the process of his conviction violated other standards that are essential to ordered liberty.
The Linkletter holding cuts the other way, however, for the Court
refused to apply Mapp retroactively on the ground that "the purpose"
of Mapp's exclusionary rule was deterrence of police misconduct
following the failure of other methods. 1 63 Mapp provides some support for the Linkletter.Court's interpretation and also contains language referring to a changed legal environment. 16 4 Mapp thus seems
tied to current conditions. But these aspects represent only a part of
Mapp.165 Also present there is the notion of Justices Brandeis and
160 Mishkin 60. This comment was developed from some of Professor Lon Fuller's
views.
161 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), is a particularly good example of both the
Court's technique and the fundamental nature of the rights involved. There, the Court
held that the sixth amendment's right of confrontation is binding on the states, and
requires the exclusion of an out of court statement by a witness who was unavailable at
trial. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that a "right of confrontation and
,cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial
which is the country's constitutional goal." Id. at 405. Although Justices Harlan and
Stewart rejected the majority's incorporation approach, they concurred in finding that
"a right of confrontation is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 408.
The Court rejected prior decisions excluding this right, and relied on Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), and more recent cases for authority, stating that "there are
few subjects upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous
than in their expressions of belief" in the fundamental nature of the right of confrontation. Id. at 405. The nature of the right and the language of the Court seem to
compel application of Pointer to old trials as well as new, not because we require a
higher level of confidence as to guilt, but because the level of confidence that was
always required was not met. One court has given Pointer retroactive effect on habeas
corpus. McBee v. Weaver, 355 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1966).
162 381 U.S. at 638. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
163 381 U.S. at 618, 636; Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1966).
164 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-55 (1961). The changed legal environment
includes, the elimination of various ways of nullifying the exclusionary rule, such as the
"silver platter" doctrine, overruled the term before in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960).
165 For doubts about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent, see Allen,
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Holmes in Olmstead,66 that "the government ought not to use evidence obtained . . . by a criminal act,"1 67 lest by such use the government ratify the illegality and become a lawbreaker. Through it has
rarely been the sole basis for setting aside a conviction, 168 or excluding
improperly obtained evidence, this notion has recurred enough in past
cases' 69 to suggest that it reflects something quite fundamental: a link
between exclusion and the rule of law.
This link can be illuminated by an analysis of the reasons for the
Brandeis-Holmes notion. Traditional wisdom holds the reasons to be
that: (1) government criminality breeds citizen criminality; 1 0 and
(2) courts should not allow themselves to be contaminated with the
fruits of "dirty business."'171 Yet, these two reasons seem inadequate
to explain today's exclusionary rule, which applies not only to clear
and inexcusable abuses-which probably come before the courts today
rarely, if ever-but also to good faith technical errors such as mistakes
over probable cause, inadequate affidavits, and inadequately descriptive warrants. Such technical errors can hardly have any tendency to
breed crime, nor are they such "dirty business" as will "contaminate"
172
the courts in any meaningful sense.
The real reason for the Brandeis-Holmes notion seems to rest on a
broad and fundamental principle: in a constitutional democracy of
limited powers, a government agency has no authority over an individual except that which is conferred upon it by law; if such authority is exceeded, the fruits of such excess should not be recognized
by any branch of government, especially that branch which has the
supra note 139, at 32-34, 37-40. For empirical confirmation of some of these doubts, see
LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule: Part I-Current
Police and Local Court Practice, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391 (1965).
166 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
167 Id. at 470. Though Olmstead involved violation of a penal statute, the point is
even more applicable to violation of a constitutional provision.
168 Except perhaps in the entrapment cases. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
454-56, 459 (1932) (Roberts, J., dissenting); PAULSEN & KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PRocEssES 903 (1962): "The accused in raising the entrapment question does not argue
that he is innocent of criminality, but rather that the courts should not convict him
because to do so would be to approve police methods which ought not to be approved."
169 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74
(1952); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445-46, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955).
170 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928); Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823,
831-32 (5th Cir. 1965).
171 Allen, supra note 139, at 20-21.
172 If we were really concerned only with flagrant abuses, we would adopt the Scottish
method and exclude only evidence obtained by abusive means, as suggested by Judge
Friendly, supra note 112, at 952. See Hardin, Other Answers: Search and Seizure,
Coerced Confessions and Criminal Trials in Scotland, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 167-69
(1964).
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foremost role in furthering the rule of law. 173 The law sets limits to
the state's exercise of power over the individual, and, 'regardless of
mitigating circumstances, a substantial overstepping of those limits
should not be legally cognizable. A court sworn to uphold and promote
observance of the law cannot adequately perform its function if it
ignores illegality in the enforcement of the law.
This is not the place for an extended analysis or defense of the doctrine of "judicial integrity." That its requirements have been observed
as often in the breach as in the performance is obvious.1 74 Still, it was
clearly an important element in Mapp, where relevant parts of the
Olmstead dissent were quoted,175 and the illegality occasioning its application to search and seizure was established as early as Wolf v.
Colorado 76 in 1949. Consideration of the basic principles underlying
Mapp and its exclusionary rule thus supports the view that all convictions in which illegally obtained evidence was admitted should be set
aside.
To summarize, newly declared constitutional criminal procedure
rights are not newly conceived or newly relevant. Rather, they reflect
fundamental principles of our legal system-principles implicit in the
concept of ordered, liberty. Regardless, then, of when it took place, a
trial conducted in a manner inconsistent with these principles should
not be permitted to stand.
Some Problems

Numerous objections to the above outlined theory may be raised:
How does upsetting old convictions further the values of due process
and the rule of law? Are all constitutional criminal procedure rights
really fundamental? What about good faith state reliance on an overruled decision? Does not such a thoery both deny and discourage
judicial creativity?
173 Indeed, it should not be legally cognizable by any governmental agency for any
purpose, whether such purpose be tax collection, economic regulation, or law enforcement.
3t74 For example, a defendant will be held for trial even though he was brought into
the jurisdiction illegally. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Until Mapp, the common
law rule that relevant evidence was admissible regardless of the manner in which it was
obtained applied in at least half the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 618, 651 (1961).
Evidence obtained illegally by private persons is still admissible. Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Evidence obtained illegally is admissible before a federal grand
jury. West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1966).
175 367 U.S. at 659-60. The Court in Linkletter seems to have misstated the point by
regarding it as limited to the problem of disparate federal-state standards. See 381 U.S.
at 634-35.
176 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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To turn first to judicial creativity, the arguments made in the preceding section do not imply that the Court has not been creative or has
not been making "new law." The Court has made "new law"-and has
done so quite openly and deliberately. But the new law the Court has
been making is nothing more-or less-than the application to the
states and the federal government of principles of legal morality fundamental to our particular constitutional democracy-the "natural
law" of our society, if you will. 177 The judge who introduces such
principles into the law is no less a creative judge, no less a "lawmaker,"
merely because he did not first conceive them. 1 8 Thus, the view proposed herein is not, I think, uncritical Blackstonianism.
On the other hand, would not complete retroactivity stifle such judicial creativity? Would not the Court be unwilling to declare some new
rights if all new rights had to be declared retroactively?179 This objection, if valid, is entitled to considerable weight, for too much still remains to be done. 8 0 There is reason to believe, however, that fears of
stifling judicial creativity by complete retroactivity are exaggerated.
In the past, when the unsettling effect was most certain and most
significant-Gideon v. Wainwright, Jackson v. Denno, Fay v. Noiathe Court did not hesitate.' 8 ' Is there much reason to expect that it
would start hesitating in the future? Moreover, a policy of giving all
constitutional criminal procedure decisions retroactive effect might
177 Oaks, Legal History in the High Court: Habeas Corpus, 64 Mxic.
L. REv. 451,
459 (1966).
178 Cf. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REv. 372 (1939).
179 In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 381, 398 P.2d 380, 390, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 198 (1965);
Brief for the State of New York, supra note 134, at 47-49. It is interesting that such
concern is now being expressed by interests which would normally be expected to applaud
judicial restraint. Indeed, the approval by prosecutors and their spokesmen of such a
legislative device as prospective overruling seems somewhat inconsistent with the complaints by many of these that the Court has been legislating too much.
180 But see the remarks of Professor Bator in Dorsen (ed.), The Proper Role of the
United States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 457 (1963).
181 See United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 26 (2d Cir. 1964) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 381 U.S. 654 (1965). Although the New York State Brief in Miranda
minimizes the Gideon effect on the ground that many states had already provided counsel,
few did so to the extent required by Gideon. Furthermore, almost all states have multiple offender laws, and sentences under such statutes even in states which provided
counsel are affected by the now invalid convictions in states which did not. United States
ex rel. Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Turpin v.
Snyder, 183 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1950); People v. Kearney, 45 Misc. 2d 1041, 258 N.Y.S.2d 769
(Sup. Ct. 1965); see Greer v. Beto, 86 Sup. Ct. 1477 (1966). In addition, parolees who are
returned to prison for parole violations will have an opportunity to raise Gideon and
Jackson v. Denno claims which they had obviously not wanted to do earlier. See United
States ex Tel. Gates v. Pate, 355 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1966). Several such Jackson v. Denno
claims have recently appeared in Erie County, New York.
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induce state courts-and, perhaps, even local police forces-to try to
anticipate future Supreme Court decisions in order to avoid large
scale losses of convictions.18 2 Non-retroactive overruling, by contrast,
reduces some of this inducement.
But how does the upsetting of old convictions further the purposes
of recent constitutional criminal procedure decisions? More particularly, if Professor Mishkin's division of due process purposes into reliability and individual dignity categories is sound, how does retroactivity further those in the latter category? The answer is, I think, that
upsetting old convictions promotes the purposes of dignity and integrity in the same way that upsetting new convictions does: in both instances, a community acting in accordance with its conception of the
norms "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" refuses to accept
the fruits of the violation of such norms. After all, how is any given
defendant's dignity and integrity furthered by the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence, of confessions obtained by coercion or in the
absence of counsel, or of statements obtained in violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination? In all such applications of the exclusionary rule, the individual defendant's dignity and integrity have
already been violated, and the subsequent use of the evidence in
court would hardly be a significantly greater violation. Clearly, the
protection of individual dignity and integrity in each application
comes not from any deterrent effect, 8 3 but rather from the fact that
state power over the individual is being confined to limits imposed
by fundamental due process concepts. 8 4
Can it realistically be said, however, that all of the facets of all the
rights recently imported into the due process clause are truly fundamental? Is it not true that although "some specifics of the Bill of
Rights, in all their manifestations, may indeed be 'process' which is
required by the conscience of mankind; others may not"?' s5 Are, for
example, all of the twists and turns of federal search and seizure law,
182 In
the Buffalo, N.Y., police training program, policemen are advised to warn a
suspect before interrogation in order to avoid the impact of a retroactive overruling
of People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y. 2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965), which held
admissible statements obtained by police after arrest and before counsel had appeared
even though the defendant had not been advised of his rights.
6
183 Even Professor Mishkin eschews this viewpoint. See Mishkin 90 n.12 . I do not
deny the great importance of deterrence as one basis for these rules, but it is not the
only factor. Even if exclusion were not the best or even a good deterrent, convictions
obtained by improper methods should still not be allowed to stand.
184 WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE

WPrr OF LmmRTY 86 (1960).
185 Henkin, supra note 151, at 78.
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or all the ramifications of the privilege against self-incrimination,
fundamental? 8 6
The short answer to these questions is that the Court evidently
thinks so, for it has retained the language of Palko8'7 and has rejected
almost all attempts to impose lesser standards on the states. 188 But
short answers are not always good answers, especially where the questions are basic. Perhaps a fuller answer is that a policy of selective incorporation of only some aspects of due process rights would raise the
same problem that Betts v. Brady' 89 did: the necessity of frequent decisions on hard issues, with the likelihood of wide differences of opinion
over the proper choices to be made. Indeed, are there objective criteria
for determining the fundamental nature of the various aspects of the
right to counsel? Of the right to be free from an unannounced entry?
Of the no comment rule? What are the factors that are clearly decisive
as opposed to being merely relevant? 190 It seems to me easier and in the
long run less abrasive simply to deem all facets of all constitutional
rights fundamental. The detriment to state sovereignty resulting from
the extension of federal protection to possibly marginal facets is more
than compensated for by the benefits of greater certainty and reduced
friction flowing from a policy of nondifferentiation among facets. 19 '
What about state reliance on overruled decisions, a consideration
that clearly influenced the Court's actions in Linkletter, Griffin, and
Tehan? All too often, state reliance does not merit protection. Unreasonable state searches and seizures were condemned as early as 1949 in
Wolf, and any state reliance on the belief that misconduct would not
be disciplined was unjustified. For years legislators, judges, prosecutors, and police ignored obvious problems of the availability of
counsel, the coercion of confessions, the admission of self-incriminatory statements, and the special needs of indigent defendants: with
respect at least to these areas, it can fairly be said that the Supreme
Court gave the states time to put their own houses in order and that
the states failed to do so. And in many cases, Escobedo being only one
188 Cf. Elkins v. United States, 864 U.S. 206, 238-39 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
187 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 819 (1987).

188 See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964). But see Henry v. Mississippi, 879 U.S. 443, 449
n.6 (1965), noting that the Court has not yet decided whether the federal search and
seizure rules apply in full to the states.
189 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
190 Cf. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements
Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. CT. Rmv. 267, 275.
191 See Kalven, The Metaphysics of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Cr. RFsv. 1, 25. For a contrary
view see Friendly, supra note 112, at 935-38.
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example, the state's own laws were violated.1 92 On such a record, it is
difficult to see that state reliance merits protection.
Nor is it clear who would be harmed by complete retroactivity. State
judges might be offended, but they certainly would not be harmed.
Policemen and prosecutors have indeed prepared cases in reliance on
prior law and thus overlooked or rejected evidence they might otherwise have used, 193 but they certainly would not become subject to
criminal liability19 4 or loss of personal reputation. States would, of
course, lose some convictions, but, as has already been indicated,195
the probable magnitude of this phenomenon is often exaggerated. And
as for the time and expense of hearings and retrials which would be
necessitated by a policy of complete retroactivity, suffice it to say that
when the preservation of individual liberties has been at stake, the
Supreme Court has rarely based its judgments on considerations of time
and expense. 198
Still, is there not a need for stability and "predictability" in the
law? Is it not true that "a holding of retroactivity would necessarily
draw into question the value of... [the Supreme Court's] decisions
as a guide for future conduct"? 1 7 This view, of course, conflicts with
the earlier one, expressed by the very same voices, that complete retroactivity will stifle judicial creativity and discourage "the future development of progressive solutions to the difficult problems of criminal
procedure";1 95 after all, such "development" will also "draw into
question the value of... [the Supreme Court's] decisions as a guide
for future conduct." This inconsistency perhaps confirms the earlier
suggestion that no necessary connection exists between judicial creativity and retroactivity. In any event, the revolution in constitutional
criminal procedure is not yet over, and instability and unpredictability
will be with us for some time to come. Complete retroactivity is thus
not likely to produce a significantly greater amount of doctrinal or
192 See text accompanying note 157 supra; Kamisar, Equal Justice 56.
193 Brief for the State of New York, supra note 134, at 42.
194 Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Applications in the Federal Courts,
71 YALE L.J. 907, 920-21 (1962); cf. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961).
195 See text accompanying notes 134-44 supra.
196 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335
(1963); Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S, 214 (1958). The expenses involved in both future
and retroactive applications of Gideon, and for future compliance with Mapp, is likely
to make any additional-and quite temporary--expense for retroactive application of
Mapp, Griffin, and Escobedo quite minor.
197 Brief for State of New York, supra note 134, at 45.
198 Id. at 47-49. See text accompanying notes 177-178 supra.
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other instability than will partial retroactivity under the reliability
theory.
CONCLUSION

In response to Professor Mishkin's question, the reasons for upsetting
old convictions on the basis of new constitutional doctrines come down
to this: new constitutional doctrines are not new conceptions but rather
reflections of principles of "ordered liberty" fundamental to our legal
system. Such principles are equally applicable to past and present trials,
for an ethical society cannot seek to retain the fruits of past defaults.
This is not to deny that complete retroactivity involves many theoretical and practical difficulties. Many of the problems frequently
linked to complete retroactivity seem to be, however, pseudo-problems,
and the others seem fewer and less troublesome than those created by
Professor Mishkin's theory. Complete retroactivity is at least consistent with the nature of newly declared constitutional rights, and it
neither ignores the present role of habeas corpus nor creates gross
inequities.

EPILOGUE
Long after this paper had been submitted for publication, the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Miranda v. Arizona 99 and
Johnson v. New Jersey.20 0 In the first, the Court went considerably
beyond both Escobedo and the facts of the four cases before it and
set down detailed guidelines designed to protect a suspect's fifth amendment privilege against the "compulsion inherent" in custodial interrogation. A week later the Court narrowly restricted the backward
thrust of both Miranda and Escobedo: because it was not the "prime"
or "basic" purpose of either case to improve the reliability of the factfinding process, the rulings were held applicable only to those cases in
which the trials began after June 13, 1966, and June 20, 1964, the
respective dates of the Miranda and Escobedo decisions.
The specific holding in neither case was very surprising. It was
expected that the Court would reaffirm and expand Escobedo, and
once Miranda was decided as a fifth amendment case, its purely prospective application was predictable. 201 What was surprising about
199 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966). Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart and White dissented.
200 86 Sup. Ct. 1772 (1966). Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
201 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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both cases was the sweep of the Court's holdings and mandates. I think
it fair to say that no one expected the Court in Miranda to issue an
opinion which tried to decide virtually every question of law that was
likely to arise202 or to mandate a detailed set of operational procedures; and few, if any, expected the Court to deny the benefits of
Miranda and Escobedo to cases still on direct appeal.
This Epilogue will briefly review the Johnson decision in terms of
its impact on the earlier discussion. Touched on will be: (1) the
"prime" or "basic purpose" test of reliability adopted by the Court;
(2) the refusal to apply Escobedo and Miranda to cases on direct review; and (3) the relation of Miranda and Escobedo to the alternate
theory of retroactivity set out above.
I.

THE DECISIONS

In Miranda,the Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination can be protected against the inherent coerciveness of custodial
interrogation only if the suspect is effectively advised of his right of
silence and ensured an opportunity to exercise that right. Accordingly, the police are now required to precede each interrogation of a
person in custody, or otherwise deprived of his liberty, with a four-fold
warning:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any question3
ing if he so desires.20
202 Thus the Court applied its ruling not only to custodial interrogation but to all
interrogations where the accused is deprived of his liberty, 86 Sup. Ct. at 1612, to
exculpatory as well as to incriminating statements, id. at 1629, and to waivers obtained
by deception or cajolery, ibid. It also granted a right to assigned counsel in cases of
indigency, id. at 1626-27; established the burden of proof in waiver cases, id. at 1628;
indicated instances where a finding of waiver would be set aside, id. at 1629; announced
a right to withdraw a waiver, id. at 1628, contrary to the rule in certain other contexts,
see Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (grand jury witness); 86 Sup. Ct. at 1628
nA5; reaffirmed that denying a lawyer the right to consult with his client violated the
sixth amendment, id. at 1623 n.35; and dealt with spontaneous declarations and with the
questioning of on-the-scene witnesses, id. at 1629-30. Almost none of these rulings was
necessary to the disposition of the cases before the Court.
203 Id.
at 1630. The Court repeated this statement in substantially the same form
several times in the opinion. The first time it did so, however, it defined the "custodial
interrogation" requiring the warning "to mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
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After this warning, the defendant can waive his rights but the prosecution must prove that such a waiver was knowing and intelligent;
moreover, the waiver may be withdrawn at any time merely by a
refusal to answer any more questions, or by a request for a lawyer.
No pressures, trickery, or cajolery may be used to obtain a waiver,
and the prosecution has the same heavy burden of proof of waiver
as in the waiver of counsel cases. 204 Further, the Court stressed that

the specific procedures suggested in its opinion need not be followed
provided there are available other equally effective methods for apprising a suspect of his right of silence and for ensuring the oppor20 5
tunity for its exercise.
In Johnson, which had originally raised only the question of the
retroactivity of Escobedo, the Court dealt with the week-old Miranda
decision as well. Reaffirming the three-fold test applied in Linkletter
and Tehan,20 6 the Court denied retroactivity to both Miranda and
Escobedo because their "prime purpose" (elsewhere in the opinion
called "basic purpose"), is not to "ensure the reliability of the factfinding process," but "to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege
against self-incrimination, the mainstay of our adversary system of
criminal justice." 207 Though the opinion noted several times that
Miranda and Escobedo did indeed "guard against the possibility of
unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,
they encompass situations in which the danger is not necessarily as
great as when the accused is subjected to overt and obvious coercion." 208 The effect of a constitutional rule on reliability, noted the
of action in any significant way." Id. at 1612. It dropped a footnote to explain: "This is
what welmeant in Escobedo when we spoke of the investigation which had focused on
the accused." Id. at 1612 n.4. Elsewhere in the opinion, however, the Court omitted the
qualifier "significantly" in referring to the restraint requiring a warning and referred
simply to "deprived of his freedom of action," id. at 1624, "freedom of action is curtailed," ibid, and "otherwise deprived of his freedom," id. at 1630. The qualifier
could make a difference in deciding whether warnings have to be given prior to
field investigations, such as under New York's "Stop and Frisk" law. N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. § 180-a; see LAFAVE, ARREST 344-47 (1965).
204 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Proof of prolonged or incommunicado interrogation would be strong evidence against
a finding of waiver. 86 Sup. Ct. at 1629.
205 Id. at 1624.
206 "We must look to the purpose of our new standards governing police interrogation, the reliance which may have been placed upon prior decisions on the subject,
and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of Escobedo
and Miranda." 86 Sup. Ct. at 1777.
207 Id. at 1779.
208

Ibid.
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Court, is a question of "degree," of "probabilities," and "of the extent
to which other safeguards are available to protect the integrity of the
truth-determining process at trial." 20 9 As one such other safeguard,
the Court emphasized that the case law on coerced confessions is still
available to past defendants, and that this test "has become increasingly
meticulous through the years.... Thus, while Escobedo and Miranda
provide important new safeguards against the use of unreliable statements at trial, the non-retroactivity of these decisions will not preclude persons whose trials have already been completed from invok210
ing the same safeguards as part of an involuntariness claim."
With respect to state reliance, the Court declared that law enforcement agencies had justifiably relied on Grooker v. California1l and
Cicenia v. Lagay,21 2 which were good law until Escobedo and Miranda,
unlike the Wolf-Mapp situation, in which the authorities knew that
they were forbidden from making unconstitutional searches. Moreover, retroactivity would seriously disrupt the administration of
justice by requiring retrials or releases of "numerous prisoners found
guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards." 213 The Court then concluded that
all of these reasons also justified limiting the retroactivity of Escobedo
214
and Miranda to trials begun after the decisions were announced.

It noted, however, that the states were of course free to adopt a more
215
liberal rule.

A. Reliability as the Necessary "Prime Purpose"
The policies and practicalities which militate against using reliability as the principal criterion for retroactivity have already been discussed. Some of the practical difficulties pointed out earlier, which
stem from Professor Mishkin's requirement that reliability be an intended effect of the particular rule announced, are compounded by
the Court's requirement that reliability be the prime or basic purpose
of the specific rule announced. The Court's new formulation would
seem to require a two-fold inquiry: (1) a subjective analysis to ascer209 Ibid.
210 Ibid. In this connection, the Court cited Davis v. North Carolina, 86 Sup. Ct.
1761 (1966), a voluntariness case decided the same day.
211 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
212 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
213 86 Sup. Ct. at 1780.
214 Ibid.
215 Id. at 1781.
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tain the prime or basic purpose; and (2) an objective analysis of the
probability and degree to which the new rule enhances reliability, taking into account "the extent to which other safeguards are available to
protect the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial." 216 The
first is an extremely difficult task, for constitutional rules often have
many purposes, and it is often exceedingly difficult to determine a rule's
prime or basic purpose. 217 The second, obviously related to the first,
involves balancing several uncertain and disputable factors, similar
to the procedure which was required by the now discarded Betts v.
Brady test.218 Moreover, the Court expressly requires this delicate
double judgment to be made with respect to each facet of each constitutional right, thus vastly increasing the number of situations in which
such a judgment will be necessary.21 9 As Professor Mishkin has noted
in another context, so large a number of retroactivity issues will keep
the state and federal courts busy with difficult retroactivity problems
for some time to come. 220 Though problems should not be avoided
simply because they are hard or numerous, these factors cannot be
ignored when considering the rule's impact on the administration of
justice.
Moreover, why give retroactive effect to a rule only when its "prime"
or "basic purpose" is to enhance reliability? Is it not enough that the
rule in question substantially improves reliability, even if such im216

Id. at 1779.

See text accompanying note 109 supra; Mishkin 81 n.85, 90 & n.126. The difficulty
can be seen in the Court's swift judgment as to Escobedo's basic purpose. In Johnson,
the Court took about five sentences to decide that the "basic purpose" of both Escobedo
and Miranda was to protect the fifth amendment privilege. 86 Sup. Ct. at 1779. But in
Miranda, the Court intimated that Escobedo might have separate significance as establishing a sixth amendment right of counsel in the police station. See 86 Sup. Ct. at 1623
n.35; note 243 infra. The Court left a good deal of uncertainty as to the role counsel
might play under the sixth amendment, so that it is difficult and probably premature
to conclude what the "basic" or "prime" purpose of such a right would be. Cf. Note,
The Curious Confusion Surrounding Escobedo v. Illinois, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 560 (1965).
It can hardly be done adequately in a few lines.
218 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
219 See text accompanying note 109 supra.
220 Mishkin 65 n.35. A glance at a few recent advance sheets already discloses a
substantial number of cases raising retroactivity issues in many different contexts. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Romano v. Fay, 360 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966) (retroactivity of
Massiah); Nance v. United States, 359 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (retroactivity of requirement of counsel at preliminary examination); Haggard v. Henderson, 252 F. Supp. 763
(M.D. Tenn. 1966) (retroactivity of state rule forbidding prejudicial joinder of habitual
criminal and other charges); Mordecai v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1966)
(retroactivity of requirement of counsel in Juvenile Court waiver proceedings).
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provement is not the prime purpose, or even intended at all?221 In

other words, should not the purely objective half of the Court's test
be sufficient? If such a standard, or even Professor Mishkin's partly
subjective "an intended effect" test, were applied, the Court's own
language would clearly support retroactivity for Miranda and Escobedo. In Johnson, the Court conceded that these cases provided important and intended "safeguards against the use of unreliable statements at trial." 222 And in discussing reliability in Miranda, the Court

expressly and unambiguously declared:
That counsel is present when statements are taken from an
individual during interrogation obviously enhances the integrity of the fact-finding processes in court. The presence of an
attorney, and the warnings delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way
that eliminates the evils in the interrogation process. Without the protections flowing from adequate warnings and the
rights of counsel, "all the careful safeguards erected around
the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any other
witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure
where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsuper223
vised pleasure of the police."
In Johnson, the Court did stress that there are other reliability
safeguards, particularly the continuing availability of the "increasingly meticulous" voluntariness standards. But one of the most important reasons for the decision in Miranda was that the secrecy of
the interrogation room precluded a meaningful implementation of
those voluntariness standards. 224 Moreover, the Court itself answered
this point in Miranda when it declared that without "adequate warnings and the rights of counsel . . . 'all the careful safeguards .

come empty formalities,'

.

. be-

"225

B. Denial of Retroactivity to Cases on Direct Review
Probably the most novel aspect of Johnson was the Court's decision
to limit the effect of Miranda and Escobedo to those cases in which
221 Cf. Professor Mishkin's analysis of the coerced confession cases, Mishkin 83-85,
and of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), Mishkin 82-83.
222 86 Sup. Ct. at 1779.
223 86 Sup. Ct. at 1623-24, 1626.
224 Id. at 1612-13, 1614.
225 Id. at 1624. For a discussion of how counsel can improve the reliability of the
process, see text accompanying notes 102-07 supra.
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trials began after the respective decisions, while leaving the LinkletterTehan direct review rule in effect for the latter situations. The Johnson choice of a trial date cut-off implicitly rejects Professor Mishkin's
theoretical distinction between direct review and collateral attack as
a basis for deciding retroactivity. However, while Professor Mishkin
presented a carefully reasoned argument for his theory, applicable to
all cases and based on a traditional and plausible distinction, the Court
presented virtually no reasoned analysis for either the LinkletterTehan or Johnson dividing lines. As noted earlier, Linkletter and
Tehan contained almost no justification for their particular cut-off
points although the Johnson opinion explained that "decisions prior
to . . . [those cases] had already established without discussion that

Mapp and Griffin applied to cases still on direct appeal at the time
they were announced." 226 With respect to Escobedo and Miranda, the
Court said only that it would be unfair to the authorities to impose
the new rules on prior cases, for they had not had fair notice of such
227
obligations prior to the decisions.
Although it is easy to criticize any cut-off point, the Court's choices
in Johnson seem particularly arbitrary, especially in view of the different choices made in Linkletter and Tehan. Ironically, insofar as good
faith reliance is concerned, the Court's rule in Johnson seems much
more appropriate to the Griffin-Tehan situation. 228 The significant
official conduct there was official comment during trial. In trials held
before April 28, 1965, the date Griffin v. Californiawas decided, there
was every reason to believe such comment was appropriate, and if
good faith reliance was to be protected, only comments in trials held
after that date should have been "penalized." On the other hand, the
most relevant official conduct in Escobedo and Miranda situations occurs during the pre-trial interrogation process and consistent protection
of official reliance on prior law would require that Escobedo and
Mirandanot be applied to cases in which police conducted interrogations before the respective dates of those decisions, regardless of the
trial dates. In short, if justified reliance by those state officers most
directly affected is the controlling consideration, the particular cut-off
229
dates chosen by the Court seem somewhat inappropriate.
86 Sup. Ct. at 1780.
Ibid.
228 In fact, as noted earlier, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), upset the only
reliance which truly merited protection. See text accompanying note 192 supra.
229 For the contention that state officials' reliance should be ignored because such
officers will not suffer any meaningful damage from retroactivity, see text accompanying
notes 193-95 supra.
226
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The announced cut-off date also imposes serious inequities on
defendants similarly placed, for it puts a premium on fortuities. For
many, the availability of Miranda and Escobedo will ultimately depend on such frustratingly inconsequential matters as the congestion
of trial dockets and attorneys' schedules; in some cases co-defendants
whose trials were severed will receive radically different treatment. We
undoubtedly will also face the prospect of mistrial motions by defendants who were on trial on June 13, 1966, and who thereby hope
to bring their cases within the scope of the new rule. Undoubtedly the
most pronounced inequity is caused by giving particular petitionerslike Escobedo and Miranda-the benefits of a new rule while withholding it from others whose cases were still on direct review when
the rule was announced.23 0 It was widely known that a decision elaborating Escobedo was imminent, most convicted defendants affected by
that case appealed and raised the issue, and it was mere accident that
Miranda, Vignera, Westover, and Stewart were fortunate enough to
have their cases chosen by the Court. Indeed, on the same day Johnson
was decided, the Court denied certiorari in over 120 cases raising issues
23
similar to Miranda,many of which were on direct review. 1
With respect to cut-off dates for future innovating decisions, the
Court's failure in Johnson to articulate any reason uniquely relevant
to the choices made, indicates that it may generally adopt the trial
date approach.
Cut-off dates are always harsh to some, but there is usually either a
good reason for the date chosen or no good reason for a different date.
23 2
Neither of these explains the Court's choice in Johnson.
C. Retroactivity for Miranda and Escobedo
The main text of this article has already set forth most of the reasons
why both Miranda and Escobedo should be given retroactive effect,
but a few points may be worth adding.
With respect to Miranda, it should be noted that insofar as that
decision sets out essential constitutional requirements, it is limited to
a few matters: (1) the privilege applies in full to custodial interroga230 See Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision:
Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 650, 673-79 (1962).
231 See 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3429-31 (June 21, 1966).
232 See CAHN, THE SENsE OF INJUsTICE 14-15 (1949): "The arbitrary, though indispensable to many of law's daily operations, is always suspect; it becomes unjust when it distinguishes between indistinguishables." For elaboration of other inequities, see text
accompanying note 70 supra.
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tion; (2) a suspect must be apprised of the privilege; and (3) he must
be given an unfettered opportunity to exercise it. The specific fourfold warning and counsel procedure set out by the Court is merely
one type of protection and is not indispensable if the privilege can be
shown to have been otherwise protected. 238 Thus, complete retroactivity for newly enunciated constitutional rights 234 would require
retroactivity only for the principle that a knowing and free exercise
of the privilege must be adequately protected and-by implicationthat any statement taken in the inherently coercive atmosphere of
custodial interrogation must be shown to have resulted from a knowing and intelligent waiver.
This basic constitutional doctrine announced in Miranda is novel
only insofar as it is now being effectively implemented for the first
time.235 As the Court was at pains to emphasize: (1) the privilege
which the decision seeks to protect is and always has been considered
to be essential to the operation of our accusatorial system and to
ensuring respect for human dignity; 23 6 (2) it has deep historical roots,
even with respect to custodial pretrial questioning, for its policies have
been reflected in the state voluntariness cases and in such federal
decisions as Bra& v. United States;23 7 (3) the privilege must be protected in order to ensure a fair trial, and to ensure the integrity of the
fact-finding processes in court;238 (4) the privilege is seriously jeopardized by the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation,
especially if the defendant is held incommunicado and not advised of
239
his rights.
Since these rights are so fundamental and deep rooted, how can we,
in justice, deny their full benefit to those whose trials antedated June
14, 1966? The injustice is aggravated by the high probability that in
man3r cases these rights were in fact violated, as the Court's catalogue
of police stratagems makes dear. Indeed, if the Court is correct in
233 86 Sup. Ct. at 1624. The defendant has the right to have a lawyer "during the
interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today." Id. at
1624, 1626.
234 See pp. 747-57 supra.
235 Almost 60 years ago, a New York judge called upon the legislature to require police
to warn defendants of their rights to avoid the danger that confessions would be induced by fear. People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 159, 89 N.E. 112, 117 (1909) (Bartlett, J.,
concurring).
236 86 Sup. Ct. at 1611, 1619.
237 168 U.S. 532 (1897). See 86 Sup. Ct. at 1621.

238 Id. at 1623-24.
239 Id. at 1612-19.
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asserting that unless protective devices are provided, no statement
taken under the "compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings ...
can truly be the product of free choice," there must be a presumption
of compulsion for such protective devices were rarely provided. Finally, does it make sense to grant retroactivity to new voluntariness
standards, which are explicitly intended to prevent encroachments on
the privilege, while denying retroactivity to Miranda's constitutional
240
core, which is aimed at precisely the same encroachments?
As for the retroactivity of Escobedo, courts may well be in some confusion as to exactly what it is that they are to apply to cases in which
the trials began in the interim between Escobedo and Miranda.
'though the Court found that the "basic purpose" of Escobedo was
to protect the fifth amendment privilege, it did nothing to dispel the
uncertainty as to when Escobedo would be deemed violated.241 More
specifically, it failed to indicate how many of the five elements in the
Escobedo holding were crucial to the decision. 242 For trials begun during the two years after Escobedo and before Miranda, it is thus uncertain, for example, whether the absence of a preliminary warning
243
will suffice to nullify a confession by a defendant in custody.
240 The continuing availability of the "increasingly meticulous" voluntariness standards
which, according to the Court, raise no issue of retroactivity, may draw some of the
sting of Johnson, for it may well allow retroactivity to many claims which are not
eligible for Miranda relief. The significant question is how much more stringent the
voluntariness standards will become. They are never likely to reach the point where a
defendant need only show either the absence of one of the four required warnings,
or the lack of strong evidence of waiver, which is all that Miranda requires. But the
Court may not be through refining voluntariness. In both Johnson and Davis v. North
Carolina, 86 Sup. Ct. 1761 (1966), decided the same day, the Court stressed that the absence
of some of the safeguards mandated by Miranda, such as advice about the privilege, or
access to outside assistance, would be "a significant factor in considering the voluntariness
of statements later made." 86 Sup. Ct. at 1764. If the conjunction of these two factors is
sufficient to preclude a finding of voluntariness, then many prisoners-probably including
Messrs. Johnson and Cassidy-will have their convictions set aside, because, until recently,
relatively few police departments have been giving warnings and even fewer have allowed
access to outside assistance from friends, relatives, or counsel. See Johnson v. New Jersey,
86 Sup. Ct. 1772, 1775-76 (1966); Davis v. North Carolina, 86 Sup. Ct. 1761 (1966); People
v. Taylor, 16 N.Y.2d 1038, 213 N.E.2d 321, 265 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1965); People v. Hocking,
15 N.Y.2d 973, 207 N.E.2d 528, 259 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1965).
241 For some of the uncertainties, see authorities cited at note 76 supra and accompanying text.
242 "[T]he investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute
constitutional right to remain silent .... " 378 U.S. at 490-91.
243 Compare People v. Dorado, 62 Col. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361 (1965), with People v.
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D. A Concluding Comment
Johnson v. New Jersey seems to be an intensely practical decision by
a Court which was attempting to forestall an overly-hostile public
reaction to Miranda and*which was troubled by the possibility of a
wholesale release of many guilty men. 244 But these considerations
should not have influenced the Court so decisively. The courts, the
police, and the public would have learned to live with the effects of
retroactivity, as they have done with so many other vociferously berated
decisions. Moreover, the very arbitrariness of the particular cut-off
dates chosen, coupled with the widely accepted belief that the decision
was in fact based on practical considerations, 245 reinforces the appearGunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 203 NE.2d 913, 252 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1965). The definition of focus
seems to be settled. See Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 1612 n.4 (1966); note 203
supra. As to the future role of Escobedo, the significant question is whether it retains any
vitality as the basis for an independent and significant right to counsel in the police station. At one point in Miranda, the Court expressly states that in Escobedo the Court
sought a protective device for the privilege, 86 Sup. Ct. at 1623, and, at another point, that
the role of counsel at trial is different from that in the interrogation room, id. at 1626.
And in Johnson, the Court seemed to treat Escobedo as if it were little more than a
weaker Miranda. See 86 Sup. Ct. at 1781. These statements may imply a narrow scope
for Escobedo. But elsewhere, the Court noted that refusal to allow Escobedo's attorney
to consult with him deprived Escobedo of an independent sixth amendment right to
counsel, citing the New York case of People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628,
243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), which Escobedo had also cited. 86 Sup. Ct. at 1623 n.35. And, at
still another point, the Court stated that the adversary system begins at the point of custody. Id. at 1629. Compare the second formulation of the holding in Escobedo, 378 U.S. at
492. These latter points reaffirm a separate sixth amendment right to counsel at the police
station or whenever there is a deprivation of liberty. Moreover, the "critical stage" doctrines of Hamilton, White, Massiah, and Escobedo itself are still relevant and applicable.
Indeed, the Court's decision in Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826 (1966), may make
the pre-trial stage and counsel's pre-trial role even more critical. There, the Court held
that certain investigative procedures such as a blood test under certain reasonable circumstances, a line-up, and other attempts to obtain physical evidence from the accused were
permissible. Since this power is carefully circumscribed, 86 Sup. Ct. at 1835-36, it will
be especially important to have counsel present to ensure that the limitations are
observed, especially if there are controversies as to the procedures employed. Thus, the
Court has probably left the door open to a right to counsel at the police station independent of the need to protect the fifth amendment privilege. See Note, The Curious Confusion Surrounding Escobedo v. Illinois, 32 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 560 (1965) and text accompanying notes 93-107 supra. If so, the pressures and needs for such assistance apart from
protection for the privilege, and the thrust of Gideon, Douglas and Hamilton, will
preclude limiting it to the man with retained counsel who calls at the station. The
Court may then have to make a further analysis to find another "basic purpose" for
Escobedo.
244 See text accompanying note 142 supra.
245 For one such reaction, see Wall St. Journal, Editorial, July 1, 1966, p. 10. See generally text accompanying notes 6 & 21-22 supra.
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ance of the Court as a legislative chamber, with all the potential strains
that such an appearance creates. When high principle is at stake, this
appearance is worth risking. However, it is much less acceptable when
no such principle is involved and the result only compounds inequity.

